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ABSTRACT
By interpreting Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to
apply in all conflicts not qualifying as international, the Supreme
Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld closed the transnational warfare
regulatory gap for the United States. This understanding and
application of Common Article 3 ensured Salim Ahmed Hamdan
and other al-Qaeda detainees held by the country received basic
humanitarian protections. However, as later interpreted by the
executive branch, the decision also laid the foundation for the
government’s legal justifications for wide-ranging and oft-criticized
military activities abroad, including drone strikes far from the “hot
battlefield.”
Ultimately, the Hamdan decision provided an
unexpected legal basis for the United States to lethally target nonState adversaries spread across the globe.
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INTRODUCTION
Reporting on the outcome of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,1 the New York
Times noted that the decision “was such a sweeping and categorical
defeat for the [Bush] administration that it left human rights
lawyers . . . almost speechless with surprise and delight...”2 Indeed,
the Supreme Court opinion appeared to present a heavy-handed
check against the President by declaring the Guantanamo military
commissions, as they stood at the time, to be unlawful. But the full
import of the case—and Hamdan’s Janus face—would emerge only
in the following years. The Court’s decision to classify the war
against al-Qaeda under the Geneva Conventions resulted in an
unexpected and perhaps counterintuitive boon to the government’s
legal authority to conduct warfare. In fact, the opinion has become
a central precedent for the executive branch in legally justifying its
long-running and geographically-dispersed operations in the global
war against non-State armed groups. This Article will trace the role
of Hamdan in how the United States government currently justifies
its overseas conduct of hostilities—both under international and
domestic law.
Part I of this Article will explore the importance of conflict
classification under the law of armed conflict and Hamdan’s essential
holding regarding the conflict with al-Qaeda. Part II begins with an
examination of how the executive branch has used Hamdan in both
public statements and disclosed legal opinions. It then examines the
far-reaching ways the United States has relied upon the opinion to
strengthen its legal case for status-based targeting of individuals
beyond the traditional “hot battlefield.” Next, the Article will
explain how the decision has been influential in justifying the
nation’s conduct of hostilities, compliance with the United Nations
Charter, and conformity with domestic Congressional authority.
Finally, in Part III, this Article offers some thoughts on the broader
impacts and potential long-term effects of Hamdan’s legacy.

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
Linda Greenhouse, Justices, 5-3, Broadly Reject Bush Plan to Try Detainees, N.Y.
TIMES (June 30, 2006),
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/30/washington/30hamdan.html
[https://perma.cc/NPQ7-X4NE].
1
2
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HAMDAN AND CONFLICT CLASSIFICATION

1.1. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
Almost immediately after the 9/11 attacks, the United States
began capturing suspected al-Qaeda actors operating abroad.3 With
physical custody, however, came the question of the legal status and
rights of the detainees.4 The Bush Administration determined that
the conflict with al-Qaeda did not fall under the legal auspices of the
Geneva Conventions, and therefore the humanitarian precepts
within those treaties did not apply to detainees. 5 With the
understanding that the country was operating in a legal lacuna that
fell beyond the international regulatory scheme, the President
ordered detainees be tried by military commission—the procedures
of which were established by the executive branch.6
Salim Hamdan, a Yemeni national, was captured by militia
forces and turned over to the United States in the early weeks of the
conflict in Afghanistan. 7 While detained at Guantanamo Bay, he
was notified that he would face a military commission for a variety
of charges stemming from his activities as bodyguard and chauffeur
for Osama bin Laden. 8 Hamdan filed a petition in federal court
3
See, e.g., Newsweek Staff, Sept. 11 Terrorists: List of Captured and Killed,
NEWSWEEK (Sep. 4, 2011), http://www.newsweek.com/sept-11-terrorists-listcaptured-and-killed-67357 [https://perma.cc/U3PC-9TA7] (noting that many of
al-Qaeda’s senior leadership were captured by January 2002).
4
The debates preceding the Hamdan decision are well-documented and
outside the scope of this paper. For an excellent discussion on the various legal
debates immediately following 9/11, see generally Jordan J. Paust, Post-9/11
Overreaction and Fallacies Regarding War and Defense, Guantanamo, the Status of
Persons, Treatment, Judicial Review of Detention, and Due Process in Military
Commissions, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1335 (2004).
5
See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Legal Counsel to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and William J.
Haynes II, General Counsel of the Department of Defense, Re: Application of Treaties
and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees at 8 (Jan. 22, 2002) (stating that Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions does not apply to “an armed conflict between
a nation-State and a transnational terrorist organization,” as the non-State group
could not be a party to the treaties).
6
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 568-69 (2006); see also Detention,
Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed.
Reg. 57833 (Nov. 13, 2001) (providing an overview of the U.S.’s understanding of
the applicable legal framework in the War on Terror).
7
See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 566 (2006).
8
Id. at 570.
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making multiple challenges to the proposed military commissions—
most notably that their procedures violated both domestic law and
international law under the Geneva Conventions.9
In a landmark decision, the Supreme Court agreed with
Hamdan on both counts. The Court held that the government
violated domestic law because the procedures and rules of evidence
for the commissions deviated substantially from those of military
courts martial—contrary to the requirements of the Uniform Code
of Military Justice. 10 Going further, the Court rejected the Bush
Administration’s contention that the Geneva Conventions did not
apply in the case, and held that the humanitarian protections
contained Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions—
applicable to non-international armed conflicts—did indeed apply.11
Therefore, Hamdan was entitled to a “regularly constituted court
affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as
indispensable by civilized peoples.” 12 The Court held that the
commissions failed to comply with this requirement, as they did not
guarantee that detainees could be present during all parts of the
proceedings, nor did they grant detainees the right to examine all
evidence against them.13
By all accounts, the Hamdan holding appeared to be a victory for
detainee rights and a rebuke against the Bush Administration’s legal
constructs surrounding the war on terror. However, in fact, the
Court’s conclusion regarding conflict classification opened the door
for the executive branch’s global application of the substantive law
of armed conflict.

Id. at 624, 631–32.
Id. at 620–624 (citing Article 36 of the UCMJ). Article 36 states: (a) The
procedure, including modes of proof, in cases before courts-martial, courts of
inquiry, military commissions, and other military tribunals may be prescribed by
the President by regulations which shall, so far as he considers practicable, apply
the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of
criminal cases in the United States district courts, but which may not be contrary to
or inconsistent with this chapter; (b) All rules and regulations made under this
article shall be uniform insofar as practicable and shall be reported to Congress.
Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 949(a) (2016).
11
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 625–35 (2006).
12
Id. at 633.
13
Id. at 634.
9

10
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1.2. Conflict Classification
1.2.1.

When is the Law of Armed Conflict Applicable?

Seventeenth-century jurist Hugo Grotius wrote that in warfare,
belligerents must “not believe that either nothing is allowable, or
that everything is.”14 That violence in warfare is restricted to only
that which is necessary is the foundational precept for the law of
armed conflict.15 This body of law attempts to “protect persons who
are not or are no longer participating in the hostilities and restricts
the means and methods of warfare”16 by striking a balance between
military necessity and humanity.17 This equilibrium permeates the
entire law of armed conflict thereby ensuring that force is applied in
warfare in a manner allowing for mission accomplishment while
simultaneously taking appropriate humanitarian considerations
into account.18 Only in an armed conflict does this specialized area
of international law apply 19 with all other violence regulated by
14

2012).

HUGO GROTIUS, ON

THE

LAW

OF

WAR

AND

PEACE 9 (Stephen C. Neff ed.,

15
See Brian J. Bill, The Rendulic ‘Rule’: Military Necessity, Commander’s
Knowledge, and Methods of Warfare, 12 Y.B. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 119 (2009)
(examining the principle of military necessity).
16
Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Advisory Serv. on Int’l Humanitarian Law,
What
is
International
Humanitarian
Law?
(2004),
https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/what_is_ihl.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H2VN-QVDS] [hereinafter ICRC, What is International
Humanitarian Law?].
17
The principle of military necessity states that a belligerent party may only
apply the degree and kind of regulated force, not otherwise prohibited by the laws
of war, required for the partial or complete submission of the enemy with the least
possible expenditure of time, life, and physical resources. Similarly, the principle
of humanity prohibits the employment of any kind or degree of force not necessary
for the purpose of war. GEOFFREY S. CORN ET AL., THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: AN
OPERATIONAL APPROACH 112 (2012).
18
See Shane R. Reeves & Jeffrey S. Thurnher, Are We Reaching a Tipping Point?
How Contemporary Challenges are Affecting the Military Necessity-Humanity Balance,
HARV. NAT. SEC. J. 1 (2013) (“This equilibrium permeates the entirety of that field of
law, thereby ensuring that force is applied on the battlefield in a manner allowing
for the accomplishment of the mission while simultaneously taking appropriate
humanitarian considerations into account.”).
19
See ICRC, What is International Humanitarian Law?, supra note 16
(“International humanitarian law applies only to [international or noninternational] armed conflict; it does not cover internal tensions or disturbances
such as isolated acts of violence. The law applies only once a conflict has begun,
and then equally to all sides regardless of who started the fighting.”).
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domestic legal authorities and, to some extent, human rights law.20
Rules for the use of force and protection of civilian rights under
international human rights norms differ in important ways from
those within the law of armed conflict.21
While there is not a conclusive definition of the term “armed
conflict,” 22 it is broadly understood to “exist whenever there is a
resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence
between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or
between such groups within a State.” 23 When an armed conflict
does exist, the law applies in its entirety,24 or in part, depending on
whether the hostilities are classified as international or noninternational. Characterizing an armed conflict is therefore the next
critical step to determine the applicable regulatory framework.

20
Robert Chesney, Who May Be Killed? Anwar al-Awlaki as a Case Study in the
International Legal Regulation of Lethal Force, Y.B. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 13, 50–56
(Michael Schmitt et al. eds., 2010). The right to life, for example, is guaranteed by
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Id. at 50. The U.S.
position is that the ICCPR does not have extraterritorial application, however. Id.
The U.S. has maintained that customary international human rights law does apply,
regardless of location. Ryan Goodman, Human Rights Law and U.S. Military
Operations in Foreign Countries: The Prohibition on Arbitrary Deprivation of Life, JUST
SECURITY (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/62630/internationalhuman-rights-law-u-s-military-operations-foreign-countries-prohibition-arbitrarydeprivation-life/ [https://perma.cc/5UF8-D9GJ].
21
See Chesney, supra note 20; Alexander Orakhelashvili, The Interaction
between Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: Fragmentation, Conflict, Parallelism, or
Convergence?, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 161 (2008) (providing an examination of the
relationship between human rights law and international humanitarian law—and
the debates surrounding that relationship. Substantive differences between human
rights law and the law of armed conflict will be discussed in section 2.2.5).
22
”In U.S. practice (and international practice in general), the meaning of this
term is based in large measure on the guidance offered by the Commentaries to the
four Geneva Conventions” which propose “a number of factors to be assessed, in a
totality-of-circumstances approach” to determine what “situations qualify as
armed conflicts.” Geoffrey S. Corn, Legal Classification of Military Operations, in U.S.
MILITARY OPERATIONS: LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 72 (Corn et al. eds., 2015)
[hereinafter Corn, Legal Classification of Military Operations].
23
Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
24
However, the law of occupation—which is part of the law of armed
conflict—only applies when a party exercises authority over another State’s
territory. Hague Convention No. IV, Respecting the Law and Customs of War on
Land art. 43, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2227 and Annex, 36 Stat. 2295 [hereinafter Hague
Regulation IV].
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1.2.2.
International Armed Conflict, Non-International Armed
Conflict, or Neither?
The law of armed conflict does not recognize a unitary concept
of warfare and relies instead on a dual categorization.25 Common
Articles 2 and 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions establish the
framework for these categories of armed conflict.26 These articles,
often called “Common Articles” as they are repeated verbatim in all
four the Conventions, 27 dictate which parts of the Geneva
Conventions are applicable.28 Common Article 2 states that in “all
cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise
between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the
state of war is not recognized by one of them” the Conventions
apply. 29 This situation is generally understood to constitute an
international armed conflict. 30 With “armed conflict” as the
initiating mechanism in Common Article 2, de facto hostilities
between State actors, versus only situations of de jure war, are
regulated.31 Further, the intensity and duration of the fighting is
generally considered to be irrelevant32 as “[a]ny difference arising
between two States and leading to the intervention of members of
25 See Dapo Akande, Classification of Armed Conflicts: Relevant Legal Concepts, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS 32 (Elizabeth
Wilmshurst ed., 2012) (“[I]nternational humanitarian law does not recognize a
unitary concept of armed conflict but, rather, recognizes two types of armed
conflicts: international and non-international.”).
26 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 2–3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter GC II]. The law of armed conflict is also applicable
in situations of occupation or partial occupation of the territory of a High
Contracting Party. Id. art. 2.
27
See GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 84–85 (2010) (explaining that there are roughly twelve
such articles found in the Geneva Conventions).
28
Corn, Legal Classification of Military Operations, supra note 22, at 70.
29
GC II, supra note 26, art. 2.
30
Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in
International
Humanitarian
Law?,
Opinion
Paper
1
(Mar.
2008),
https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armedconflict.pdf [https://perma.cc/5DAE-4TK4] [hereinafter ICRC Armed Conflict].
31
See 3 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12
AUGUST 1949: COMMENTARY 23 (Jean S. Pictet et al. eds., 1960) [hereinafter
COMMENTARY, GC III] (noting that “[t]he occurrence of de facto hostilities is
sufficient” to satisfy the conditions established in Common Article 2).
32 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶ 69–70 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999).
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the armed forces is an armed conflict within the meaning of Article
2.” 33 Common Article 2 is therefore relatively easy to trigger, as
even detaining a member of the enemy force may be enough to
initiate an international armed conflict.34
In comparison, determining the existence of a non-international
armed conflict is more complicated, as the line of demarcation
between internal State violence and hostilities rising to a sufficient
threshold level—thereby triggering international law—is often
unclear.35 At times called civil wars, rebellions, revolutions, guerilla
warfare, resistance movements, internal uprisings, or wars of selfdetermination, 36 these conflicts are simply described in Common
Article 3 as “not of an international character occurring in the
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties.”37 The drafters of
the Geneva Conventions, hoping to regulate as many of these
internal struggles as possible,38 avoided concretely describing a noninternational armed conflict. Instead, the Commentary to Article 339
offers a number of non-binding criteria that, when looked at in
totality, help assess the existence of a “genuine armed conflict from
a mere act of banditry or an unorganized and short-lived
insurrection.” 40 Despite the belief that these subjective factors
33
COMMENTARY, GC III, supra note 31, at 23. Again, it is important to note that
Common Article 2 is triggered “even if one of the Parties denies the existence of a
state of war.” Id.
34
Id. (“Even if there has been no fighting, the fact that persons covered by the
Convention are detained is sufficient for its application. The number of persons
captured in such circumstances is, of course, immaterial.”).
35
Corn, Legal Classification of Military Operations, supra note 22 , at 73–74.
36 EVE LA HAYE, WAR CRIMES IN INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICTS 5 (2008).
37 GC II, supra note 26, art. 3.
38
See generally COMMENTARY, GC III, supra note 31, at 36–37 (expressing the
ICRC’s view that “no Government can object to observing, in its dealings with
enemies, whatever the nature of the conflict between it and them, a few essential
rules . . . under its own laws“).
39
Common Articles 2 and 3 also have identical commentary language in each
of the four separate Commentaries.
40
INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, CONVENTION (IV) RELATIVE TO THE
PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR. GENEVA, 19 AUGUST 1949,
COMMENTARY OF 1958, ART. 3, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/COM/380600006?OpenDocument [https://perma.cc/GDU7-2Q5R]. See also COMMENTARY,
GC III, supra note 31, at 35–36. The non-binding criteria include that: the non-State
armed group is an organized military force, is under responsible command, with
control of territory, has the means to respect and ensure respect for the Geneva
Convention, and the State actor responds with their regular armed forces. Id. Of
these criteria, a State responding to a non-State threat with their armed forces “is a
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would result in the broad application of the humanitarian
protections embedded in Common Article 3, the opposite has
typically occurred. The ambiguity creates a blurry line between
“isolated and sporadic acts of violence” 41 and non-international
armed conflicts. States, looking to “avoid the perception of having
lost control of an internal situation,”42 have often exploited this gray
area by interpreting the non-binding criteria as indicating their
particular internal disturbance as falling below the threshold of
armed conflict. As a result, it has been historically rare for nations
experiencing such conflicts to publicly acknowledge that a noninternational armed conflict exists.43
Without a definitive description of what constitutes a “noninternational armed conflict,” various understandings of the phrase
exist. Additionally, Protocol II describes these conflicts as those
which are not covered by Additional Protocol I and:
which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party
between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other
organized armed groups which, under responsible
command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as
to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military
operations and to implement this Protocol.44
Controlling sufficient territory from which to launch military
operations, a criterion to the Additional Protocol II definition, is

significant indicator that the situation has most likely crossed the threshold into the
realm of armed conflict.” Corn, Legal Classification of Military Operations, supra note
22, at 74.
41
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol II) art. 1(2), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 611 [hereinafter AP II]. AP II
“supplements Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions.” Id. AP II has not
been ratified by the United States. However, the United States views much of AP
II as customary international law and therefore obligates itself to follow those
specific provisions when an armed conflict is triggered. Michael J. Matheson, The
United States Position on the Relation of Customary International Law to the 1977
Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, in 2 AM. U.J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 419,
430–31 (Jan. 22, 1987).
42
Corn, Legal Classification of Military Operations, supra note 22, at 73–74.
43
JUDGE ADVOC. GEN.’S LEGAL CTR. & SCH., INT’L & OPERATIONAL L. DEP’T,
OPERATIONAL L. HANDBOOK 15 (William Johnson & David Lee eds., 2014),
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/operational-lawhandbook_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/H4WC-ME2P]. This is especially the case
for armed conflicts occurring before 9/11. Id.
44
AP II, supra note 41, at 611.
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rarely satisfied by non-State armed groups.45 Further, according to
this definition, hostilities exclusively between non-State armed
groups do not qualify as a non-international armed conflict.46
The two factors noted in the Prosecutor v. Tadić47 case are more
widely accepted as establishing the existence of a non-international
armed conflict. 48 Under the first factor, hostilities must rise to a
minimum level of intensity and duration, which amounts to
protracted armed violence.49 Under the second factor, the non-State
armed groups must achieve a requisite level of organization—to
include a chain of command and “the capacity to sustain military
operations.” 50 This two-part definition has been adopted by the
International Criminal Court51 and the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC),52 as well as many States.53
In terms of geographic scope, non-international armed conflicts
were historically envisioned as civil wars in which hostilities are
fought exclusively within the internal borders of a single State. 54
While the term “internal” is not used within Common Article 3,55
SOLIS, supra note 27, at 131.
ROBERT KOLB & RICHARD HYDE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF ARMED CONFLICTS 79–80 (2008).
47
Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, ¶ 562 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997).
48 ICRC Armed Conflict, supra note 30, at 3.
49 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, ¶¶ 562,
567–68 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997).
50
ICRC Armed Conflict, supra note 30, at 3.
51 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(f), July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 98 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. Even qualification under noncontroversial criteria, such as the need for an organized non-State armed group, is
open to debate. See, e.g., Akande, supra note 25, at 51 (giving a number of factors
that indicate that a group is organized).
52
ICRC Armed Conflict, supra note 30, at 5.
53 MINISTRY OF DEF., JOINT SERV. MANUAL OF THE L. OF ARMED CONFLICT 386–87
(2004),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads
/attachment_data/file/27874/JSP3832004Edition.pdf [https://perma.cc/5HD37CSM].
54 See, e.g., Rogier Bartels, Timelines, Borderlines and Conflicts: The Historical
Evolution of the Legal Divide between International and Non-International Armed
Conflicts, 91 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 35, 39 (Mar. 2009); Yoram Dinstein,
Concluding Remarks on Non-International Armed Conflicts, in 89 INT’L L. STUD. 399, 400
(2013) [hereinafter Dinstein, Concluding Remarks] (“The first vital ingredient of
NIAC relates to its internal nature, i.e., that it is waged within a State.”).
55
See GC II, supra note 26, art. 3 (“In the case of armed conflict not of an
international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting
45
46
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the Commentary states that, “[s]peaking generally, it must be
recognized that the conflicts referred to in Article 3 are armed
conflicts, with armed forces on either side engaged in hostilities—
conflicts, in short, which are in many respects similar to an
international war, but take place within the confines of a single
country.”56 Both the Rome Statute and Additional Protocol II seem
to contemplate the internal nature of these hostilities by defining
these conflicts as taking place within the territory of a single nation.57
1.2.3.
What Substantive Parts of the Law of Armed Conflict
Apply in Each Type of Conflict?
Armed conflicts are governed by a combination of treaty law
and customary law.58 According to the language of Common Article
2, the terms of the four Geneva Conventions apply in declared wars
or any armed conflicts between High Contracting Parties as well as
in cases of partial or total occupation.59 Additionally, all customary
law that comprises the law of armed conflict is applicable in
international armed conflicts.60
A more limited body of positive law regulates non-international
armed conflicts. 61 Common Article 3, called a “convention in
miniature” by the Commentary, is the Geneva Conventions’
exclusive regulatory provision applicable in non-international
Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the
following provisions….“).
56
4 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST
1949: COMMENTARY 36 (Jean S. Pictet et al. eds., 1958) [hereinafter COMMENTARY, GC
IV].
57 See Rome Statute, supra note 51, art. 8(2)(f) (“It applies to armed conflicts
that take place in the territory of a State.”); see also AP II, supra note 41, art. 1
(discussing how the Protocol applies “in the territory of a High Contracting Party”).
58 Corn, Legal Classification of Military Operations, supra note 22, at 70.
59 GC II, supra note 26, art. 2.
60 See U.S. ARMY, JUDGE ADVOC. GEN.’S LEGAL CTR. & SCH., INT’L & OPERATIONAL
L. DEP’T, L. OF ARMED CONFLICT DESKBOOK 24–25 (5th ed., 2015) (noting that the
entire law of armed conflict applies in an international armed conflict).
61 See GC II, supra note 26, art. 3 (stating that “in the case of armed conflict not
of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High
Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a
minimum” the limited provisions found within the article); see also ICRC, What is
International Humanitarian Law?, supra note 16 (“A more limited range of rules apply
to internal armed conflicts and are laid down in Article 3 common to the four
Geneva Conventions as well as in Additional Protocol II.”).
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armed conflicts.62 While there are some treaties that regulate noninternational armed conflicts, 63 this body of law is less
comprehensive than that applicable to international armed
conflicts. 64 In regards to customary international law, 65 however,
States generally agree that most of the same rules apply regardless
of the characterization of the conflict.66 This expansive application
of customary international law, combined with existing relevant
treaties, results in a broad legal framework for regulating noninternational armed conflicts.67

62
See COMMENTARY, GC III, supra note 31, at 34 (“Article 3 is like a ‘Convention
in miniature’. It applies to non-international armed conflicts only, and will be the
only Article applicable” to the conflict participants.).
63
Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the Rome
Statute regulate non-international armed conflict in certain situations. The United
States is not a party to either of these treaties. Additionally, there are a number of
treaties applicable to both international and non-international armed conflicts. See,
e.g., Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, 1974
U.N.T.S. 317; Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their
Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163; Dinstein, Concluding Remarks, supra
note 54, at 406–07 (listing treaties applicable in both types of conflicts).
64
David Wallace et al., Trying to Make Sense of the Senseless: Classifying the
Syrian War under the Law of Armed Conflict, 25 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 555, 577 (“As a
matter of positive law, the differences between these two types of conflicts are
significant with those characterized as international far more heavily regulated than
those classified as non-international.”) (citation omitted).
65
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN REL. L. OF THE U.S. § 102(c)(2) (1987)
(“Customary international law results from a general and consistent practice of
States followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.”). More specifically, for a
State practice “to become a rule of customary international law it must appear that
the States follow the practice from a sense of legal obligation (opinion juris sive
necessitates); a practice that is generally followed but which States feel legally free
to disregard does not contribute to customary law.” Id. at cmt. c.
66 See, e.g., Corn, Legal Classification of Military Operations, supra note 22, at 75
(describing the law regulating non-international armed conflicts as “expanding”);
Michael N. Schmitt, The Status of Opposition Fighters in a Non-International Armed
Conflict, 88 INT’L L. STUD. 119 (2012) (outlining many of the customary laws that
apply in both international and non-international armed conflict).
67 See generally Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber
Judgment, ¶¶ 96–127 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999)
(recognizing that non-international armed conflicts trigger a comprehensive body
of international law).
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Conflict Classification in Hamdan

The long-running war between the United States and al-Qaeda
that began on September 11, 2001 appeared to escape traditional
Sometimes called a
notions of conflict classification. 68
“transnational war,” 69 these hostilities between a sovereign State
and a globally dispersed non-State actor 70 did not “satisfy the
requisite inter-State dispute element” of an international armed
conflict, nor the “traditional internal interpretation” of a noninternational armed conflict. 71 Instead, having both international
and non-international characteristics, the war appeared to occupy a
gap between these two categories. This failure of the traditional
classification paradigm gave rise to numerous legal controversies,
including the issue of detainee treatment.72
In arguing Hamdan, the Bush administration maintained that the
conflict against al-Qaeda and its associates was neither a
traditionally understood international conflict, nor a noninternational conflict under the Geneva Conventions.73 Specifically,
68
NAT’L COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., 9-11 COMMISSION
REPORT, 362 (2004) [hereinafter 9-11 COMMISSION REPORT] (“In this sense, 9/11 has
taught us that terrorism against American interests ‘over there' should be regarded
just as we regard terrorism against America ‘over here.’ In this same sense, the
American homeland is the planet.”).
69
Geoffrey S. Corn & Eric Talbot Jensen, Transnational Armed Conflict: A
“Principled” Approach to the Regulation of Counter-Terror Combat Operations, 42 ISR. L.
REV. 46–79 (2009).
70
9-11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 68, at 362 (noting that transnational
armed groups are not deterred like traditional hostile States or easily spotted like
historic armed groups).
71
See Corn, Legal Classification of Military Operations, supra note 22, at 77
(discussing how transnational armed conflicts have “been the most significant
source of contemporary conflict classification uncertainty”); see also U.S. DEP’T OF
DEF. QUADRENNIAL DEF. REV. REP. 8 (Feb. 2010) (discussing the difficulty in
categorizing contemporary conflicts).
72 See Shane R. Reeves & David Lai, A Broad Overview of the Law of Armed
Conflict in the Age of Terror, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF COUNTERRORISM LAW 139, 142–44
(noting the importance of characterizing a conflict as either international or noninternational).
73 Brief for Respondent at 26, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 547 (2006). The
government argued that: The Convention seeks to regulate the conduct of warfare
to which it applies with respect to nation-states that have entered the Convention
and agreed to abide by its terms, but is does not purport to apply to every armed
conflict that might arise or to crowd out the common law of war. Instead, as
explained below, the Convention applies only to those conflicts identified in
Articles 2 and 3. If an armed conflict, therefore, does not fall within the
Convention, the Convention simply does not regulate it. Id.
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the government argued that although the United States was
engaged in an armed conflict “of an international character”74 with
al-Qaeda, Common Article 2 nonetheless did not apply because it is
only applicable to conflicts between States, or High Contracting
Parties to the Geneva Conventions. 75 Further, the government
argued that Common Article 3 also did not apply because that
Article is applicable only “[i]n the case of armed conflict not of an
international character occurring the territory of one of the High
Contracting Parties.” 76 As the conflict with al-Qaeda was “of an
international character,” taking place in multiple countries, the
definition was inapplicable. 77 Thus, it argued, the treatment of
detainees taken from the battlefield escaped regulation under the
Geneva Conventions.78
The Court disagreed with the government’s interpretation,
however, finding that the basic humanitarian protections, as
outlined in Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, were
in fact applicable.79 The exact legal reasoning behind this finding,
however, is unclear from the text of the opinion.80 The Court failed
to state outright that the United States was involved in a noninternational armed conflict—as defined by the Geneva
Conventions—with al-Qaeda.
Instead, it responded to the
government’s argument that the war against al-Qaeda was an
international armed conflict by stating that it:
[n]eed not decide the merits of this argument because there
is at least one provision of the Geneva Conventions that
applies here even if the relevant conflict is not one between
signatories. Article 3 . . . provides that in a “conflict not of
an international character occurring in the territory of one of
Id. at 48.
Id. at 38–39. The Government noted, in contrast, that Common Article 2 may
apply to the U.S.’s engagement with Afghanistan’s Taliban regime. Id. at 40.
76 Id. at 48 (citing the Geneva Conventions; emphasis added in brief).
77 Id. According to the Government’s argument, the United States could still
choose to apply the (presumably customary) law of war, in the absence of
applicable treaty law, but was not bound to the provisions of the Geneva
Conventions in relation to detainee treatment. Id. at 26.
78 Id. at 26.
79 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 547, 629 (2006).
80 See Marko Milanovic, Lessons for human rights and humanitarian law in the war
on terror: comparing Hamdan and the Israeli Targeted Killings case, 89 INT’L REV. RED
CROSS 373, 375–81 (2007) (criticizing the U.S. Supreme Court for its claim that there
are “armed conflicts which are governed by the law of war but are not regulated by
it”).
74
75
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the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall
be bound to apply, as a minimum,” certain provisions
protecting “[p]ersons taking no active part in the hostilities,
including members of armed forces who have laid down
their arms and those placed hors de combat by . . .
detention.”81
Legal scholars have struggled to make sense of this holding—
specifically in how precisely the Court determined why Common
Article 3 was applicable.82 One understanding is that as a matter of
treaty law, Common Article 3, at a minimum, applies even in a
conflict that may be considered international. 83 As is most
commonly understood, however, the Court seems to be stating that
the United States is, indeed, engaged in a non-international armed
conflict with al-Qaeda, as defined by Common Article 3. 84 The
Hamdan majority decided “the term ‘conflict not of an international
character’ is used in ‘contradistinction to a conflict between
nations.’”85 The Court therefore took the view that Common Article
3 applied to any armed conflict not otherwise meeting the definition
of international.86
The Court’s analysis has been strongly criticized by some
scholars.87 Notably, the Court did not expressly state its reasoning
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 547, 629 (2006).
See Milanovic, supra note 80, at 377 (saying that there are several
possibilities for the Court’s conclusion, including that it rested on the belief that the
requirements of Article 3 may apply as a matter of customary law); see also
Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Hamdan and Common Article 3: Did the Supreme Court Get It
Right?, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1525, 1542 (2007) (stating that Justice Stevens’ use of
negative inferences in the opinion leaves an open question as to the actual legal
reasoning behind the application of Common Article 3).
83
Milanovic, supra note 80, at 377.
84 Id. at 377–78 (noting that it is “remarkable how little support the Court
actually invokes for such an ahistorical position” as non-international armed
conflicts have traditionally been limited to internal conflicts occurring in a single
State).
85 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 547, 630 (2006).
86 See Eran Shamir-Borer, Revisiting Hamdan v. Rumsfeld’s Analysis of the Laws
of Armed Conflict, 21 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 601, 608 (2007) (describing the Court’s
approach as adopting a “residual view” of Common Article 3).
87 See, e.g., Julian Ku & John Yoo, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Functional Case for
Foreign Affairs Deference to the Executive Branch, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 179, 190 (2006)
(asserting that the Court’s reasoning in its conclusion was “weak”). Some have
argued that in its reasoning behind the applicability of Common Article 3, the
Hamdan Court appears to gloss over important historical precedents and, at some
points, possibly misinterpret cited authorities. Milanovic, supra note 80, at 379–81.
81
82
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in determining, first, that an armed conflict was in existence 88 —
although the government had not contested this fact in their brief.89
The Court also avoided a traditional analysis of the conflict
according to the Tadić factors—including an examination of the
relative duration and intensity of hostilities and specific
characteristics of al-Qaeda, including level of organization and
command structure—which made it sufficient to trigger Common
Article 3.90 Additionally, the Court left unresolved the fundamental
underpinning of their decision on the applicability of Common
Article 3: is this conflict classification limited to the United States’
engagement with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, or is the conflict status
applicable on a global scale? 91 As will be discussed below, the
United States government itself has generally given the broadest
reading to this holding.
2.

THE U.S. GOVERNMENT’S USE OF HAMDAN

2.1. Immediate Response and Enduring Influence
The Hamdan decision had direct and timely effects on the U.S.
military’s legal positions regarding the war on terror. One week
after the opinion was announced, the acting Secretary of Defense
mandated that military leaders uphold the requirements of
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions with regards to the
See also Michael W. Lewis, International Myopia: Hamdan’s Shortcut to “Victory,” 42
U. RICH. L. REV. 687, 706 (2008) (“The Hamdan court defined armed ‘conflict not of
an international character,’ determined the requirements of a regularly constituted
court, and decided what judicial guarantees are recognized as indispensable by
civilized people in just over five pages . . . without significantly reviewing the
drafting history of Common Article 3 and the Additional Protocols.”). But see Corn,
Legal Classification of Military Operations, supra note 22, at 78 (stating that Hamdan
validated the D.C. Circuit Court’s concurrence by Judge Stephen Williams). Under
this view, “it is fundamentally inconsistent with the logic of the [law of armed
conflict] to detach the applicability of regulation from de facto hostilities.” Id.
88 See Brief of Respondent, supra note 73, at 26 (discussing the standards for
establishing an “armed conflict” under international law).
89 Id.
90 See supra notes 47–53 and associated text (discussing the wide consensus
that the Tadić case articulated the proper test for application of Common Article 3).
The Court did not indicate why it omitted a consideration of those factors in its
analysis.
91
Milanovic, supra note 80, at 377.
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conflict with al-Qaeda, in compliance with Hamdan. 92 The
memorandum did not articulate a geographical limit to this nowcategorized conflict. 93 Other administration officials appeared to
take similar views, indicating that the laws of armed conflict—
applicable to non-international conflicts—applied to the hostilities
with al-Qaeda, without noting State-border limitations. 94
Statements subsequently made by other government officials—both
in the Bush and Obama administrations—indicated that the
classification of the conflict with al-Qaeda had some importance in
the conduct of hostilities, but the exact legal import of the case was
unclear.95
The critical status of Hamdan in the military’s legal construct on
the war on terror became more discernable with forthcoming
publications, including the United States Army Judge Advocate
General’s Legal Center and School’s Law of Armed Conflict
Deskbook96 and the Department of Defense’s Law of War Manual.97
These reference books for military law practitioners and
commanders were notable in several respects as to their treatment
of Hamdan. In the Law of Armed Conflict Deskbook, the authors
continued to define a “non-international armed conflict” in terms of
the Tadić factors. 98 Confusingly, it also referenced Hamdan in a
92
See Gordan England, Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military
Departments et al., Application of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to
the Treatment of Detainees in the Department of Defense (July 7, 2006) (noting that
the Department of Defense generally complied with other aspects of the Geneva
Conventions even before the ruling).
93 Id. (“The Supreme Court has determined that Common Article 3 to the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 applies as a matter of law to the conflict with alQaeda.”).
94
For example, in a statement regarding the Hamdan decision, former Legal
Adviser to the State Department John Bellinger stated that “the Administration
reads the Hamdan decision to accept that the U.S. is in an armed conflict—and
therefore that the laws of war are appropriate to apply—but that the armed conflict
is not of an international character.” Legal Adviser John B. Bellinger, III, Postings
on Opinio Juris blog (Jan. 2007), https://www.State.gov/s/l/2007/116111.htm
[https://perma.cc/E2FF-S5Y5].
95 See, e.g., Speech of Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State,
Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, Washington, D.C.
(Mar. 25, 2010), https://2009-2017.State.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/index.htm
[https://perma.cc/WQB5-AK4U] (“As I have explained, as a matter of
international law, the United States is in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda…. “).
96
RICHARD P. DIMEGLIO ET AL., LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT DESKBOOK (Andrew
D. Gillman & William J. Johnson eds., 2012) [hereinafter LOAC Deskbook].
97
OFF. OF GEN. COUNSEL, DEP’T OF DEF., DEP’T OF DEF. LAW OF WAR MANUAL
(June 2015) (updated Dec. 2016) [hereinafter Law of War Manual].
98
LOAC Deskbook, supra note 96, at 26.
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footnote describing a Common Article 3 classification by stating that
Hamdan stood for the proposition that a non-international armed
conflict was in contradistinction to a conflict between nations.99 The
footnote also noted that “Hamdan is significant because the Court
recognized that a Common Article 3 conflict can expand beyond the
territory of one particular state.”100 The Court in Hamdan did not
expressly do this, however—although the holding also did not seem
to preclude this understanding of a Common Article 3 conflict. The
U.S. Department of Defense Law of War Manual articulated a more
faithful reading of Hamdan, stating that Common Article 3 reflected
“minimum standards for humane treatment that apply to all
military operations.” 101 The Law of War Manual also more
obviously adopted the “contradistinction” view of noninternational armed conflicts espoused by the decision.102
The use of Hamdan as precedent for legally justifying military
activities was further illuminated by the Department of Justice’s
(DOJ) White Paper on Targeted Killing103 and associated Office of
Legal Counsel’s (OLC) memorandum on the strike on Anwar alAwlaki. 104 The White Paper outlined the DOJ’s legal position
Id. at 25, n. 21.
Id. The same concept of a non-international armed conflict was retained in
subsequent versions. See DEAN L. WHITFORD ET AL., INT’L AND OPERATIONAL L. DEP’T,
THE JUDGE ADVOC. GEN. LEGAL CTR. & SCH., L. OF ARMED CONFLICT DESKBOOK 25–27
(William
J.
Johnson
&
David
H.
Lee
eds.,
2014),
https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/LOAC-Deskbook-2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8JHG-8G2H]; RYAN DOWDY ET AL., INT’L AND OPERATIONAL LAW
DEP’T, THE JUDGE ADVOC. GEN. LEGAL CTR. & SCH., L. OF ARMED CONFLICT DESKBOOK
25–26 (Rachel S. Mangas et al. eds., 2016).
101
Law of War Manual, supra note 97, ¶ 8.1.4.1.
102 Id. ¶ 3.3.1. “If two or more States oppose one another, then this type of
armed conflict is known as an ‘international armed conflict’ because it takes place
between States. However, a state of war can exist when States are not on opposite
sides of the conflict. These other types of conflict are described as ‘not of an
international character’ or ‘non-international armed conflict.’” Id. (citing Hamdan
v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630 (2006)).
103
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed Against a U.S.
Citizen Who is a Senior Operational Leader of Al-Qa’ida or An Associated Force (Nov. 8,
2011),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/deptwhite-paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/72SS-S363] [hereinafter DOJ White Paper].
104
Memorandum from David J. Barron, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of
Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to the Att’y Gen., Applicability of Federal
Criminal Laws and the Constitution to Contemplated Lethal Operations Against
Shaykh Anwar al-Aulaqi (July 16, 2010) [hereinafter OLC Memo]. The White Paper
was drafted for Congressional lawmakers after they had requested access to the al99

100
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regarding the use of lethal force against an American citizen located
in a foreign State, outside the primary area of active hostilities.105
Similarly, the OLC Memorandum contemplated using lethal force
against a specific al-Qaeda leader located in Yemen—who was also
an American citizen.106 The OLC Memorandum cited Hamdan eight
times in its unredacted text to support legal justifications for the
strike.107
According to the DOJ White Paper:
. . . [T]he United States retains its authority to use force
against al-Qa’ida and associated forces outside the area of
active hostilities when it targets a senior operational leader
of the enemy forces who is actively engaged in planning
operations to kill Americans. The United States is currently
in a non-international armed conflict with al-Qa’ida and its
associated forces. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557,
628-31 (2006) (holding that a conflict between a nation and a
transnational non-state actor, occurring outside the nation’s
territory, is an armed conflict “not of an international
character” (quoting Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions) because it is not a “clash between nations”).
Any U.S. operation would be part of this non-international
armed conflict, even if it were to take place away from the
zone of active hostilities.108
This legal opinion shows that the United States government
applied the Hamdan holding to a broad, global context, in which
conflict classification “attached” to members of the non-State armed
group, irrespective of location.

Awlaki memo, which, at that time, was classified. The White Paper was officially
released by the DOJ in 2013 shortly after it was leaked to NBC News. See Charlie
Savage, DoJ White Paper on Killing Citizens Deemed Terrorists, N.Y. TIMES (June 24,
2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/06/24/us/killingcitizenswhitepape
r.html [https://perma.cc/P9WL-6PSY]. The redacted OLC memorandum was
later released as a result of litigation. Thomas Earnest, DOJ OLC Targeted Killing
Memo
Released,
JUST
SECURITY
(June
23,
2014),
https://www.justsecurity.org/12078/doj-olc-targeted-killing-memo-released/
[https://perma.cc/LZG8-CFR5].
105
DOJ White Paper, supra note 103, at 1.
106
OLC Memo, supra note 104, at 21. Al-Awlaki was a leader in al-Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Id.
107 Id. at 24, 26–28.
108
DOJ White Paper, supra note 103, at 3.
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Likewise, the OLC Memorandum espoused an expansive view
of the meaning of Hamdan:
In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court held that the
United States is engaged in a non-international armed
conflict with al-Qaida . . . Here, unlike in Hamdan, the
contemplated DoD operation would occur in Yemen, a
location that is far from the most active theater of combat
between the United States and al-Qaida. That does not affect
our conclusion, however, that the combination of facts
present here would make the DoD operation in Yemen part
of the non-international armed conflict with al-Qaida. To be
sure, Hamdan did not directly address the geographic scope
of the non-international armed conflict between the United
States and al-Qaida that the Court recognized, other than to
implicitly hold that it extended to Afghanistan, where
Hamdan was apprehended. The Court did, however,
specifically reject the argument that non-international armed
conflicts are necessarily limited to internal conflicts . . . The
Court explained that this interpretation—that the nature of
the conflict depends at least in part on the status of the
parties, rather than simply on the locations in which they
fight—in turn accords with the view expressed in the
commentaries to the Geneva Conventions that “the scope of
application” of Common Article 3, which establishes basic
protections that govern conflicts not of an international
character, “must be as wide as possible.”109
This excerpt shows that the OLC read Hamdan permissively—
allowing the conflict classification to reach beyond the borders of
Afghanistan, although the Court did not directly state such.110 The
memorandum did acknowledge strong scholarly and international
opposition for this position, but ultimately found it unconvincing.111
109
OLC Memo, supra note 104, at 24 (internal citations omitted). The opinion
was careful to restrict its application to Yemen, however. Id. at n. 30.
110
Later, the OLC Memo states that “[t]here is little judicial or other
authoritative precedent that speaks directly to the question of the geographic scope
of a non-international armed conflict in which one of the parties is a transnational,
non-State actor and where the principal theater of operations is not within the
territory of the nation that is a party to the conflict.” Id. at 25.
111 Id. at 25 (citing Mary Ellen O’Connell, Combatants and the Combat Zone, 43
U. RICH. L. REV. 845, 857–59 (2009); Philip Alston, Report of the Special Rapporteur on
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions ¶ 54 (U.N.H.R.C., Fourteenth Session,
Agenda Item 3, May 28, 2010)).
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The OLC Memorandum excerpt above also used Hamdan for the
proposition that the status of the parties to the conflict is of greater
importance than geographical location for purposes of conflict
classification. 112 In effect, the Hamdan Court’s highly inclusive
categorization of what constitutes a non-international armed
conflict was further widened and applied outside of the context of
Afghanistan by the executive branch in both legal opinions.
Nothing in the Hamdan Court’s analysis limited this interpretation.
After establishing the operation was indeed a part of the larger
non-international armed conflict with al-Qaeda, the OLC
Memorandum then considered whether the proposed operation
would comply with the applicable laws of war.113 Admitting that
the Geneva Conventions did not themselves establish robust
restrictions on conduct for non-international armed conflicts, the
memorandum went on to assert that the rules within the treaties
were not “exclusive” since the “laws and customs of war also
impose limitations on the conduct of participants...” 114 This
statement is notable, as the government here specifically linked
qualification of an armed conflict under Common Article 3, as
categorized by Hamdan, and the resulting trigger of the customary
rules of war, including targeting. The government thus made the
treaty qualification of a “conflict not of an international character”
and the associated application of base-line humanitarian protections
of Common Article 3 congruent with the triggering of the customary
jus in bello 115 rules of armed conflict. Although reflecting a longunderstood view, this conclusion is not an entirely clear one under
international law.116 The assertion rationally extrapolated from the
112
The Hamdan Court did not discuss the qualities of al-Qaeda which made it
a proper party to a non-international conflict in any detail. It did conclude,
however, that the phrase “not of an international character” applied when one of
the parties to a conflict was not a State. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630
(2006).
113
OLC Memo, supra note 104, at 27–28.
114 Id. at 28 (citing Submission of the Government of the U.S. (July 17, 1995) at
33, n. 53, Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-1).
115
Or, the laws that govern how hostilities are conducted. Int’l Comm. of the
Red Cross, Jus in bello – Jus ad bellum, https://www.icrc.org/en/war-and-law/ihlother-legal-regmies/jus-in-bello-jus-ad-bellum [https://perma.cc/66RL-YUTP].
116
See Geoffrey S. Corn, Hamdan, Lebanon, and the Regulation of Hostilities: The
Need to Recognize a Hybrid Category of Armed Conflict, 40 VAND. J. TRANS. L. 295, 301
(Aug. 16, 2012) (stating that although Common Articles 2 and 3 do not explicitly
state that they establish the triggers for the customary law of war, “they rapidly
evolved to create such an effect”) (internal citations omitted) [hereinafter Corn,
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conclusion of the Hamdan Court, which ostensibly spoke to detainee
treatment only, and not the concomitant application of the entire
framework of customary laws that apply in non-international armed
conflicts.117
Importantly, the Hamdan Court did not appear to contemplate
that its reasoning would result in the broad application of this body
of customary law.118 In contrast, other international court decisions
have specifically invoked the customary law of armed conflict in
conjunction with the application of Common Article 3. In Nicaragua

Hamdan, Lebanon, and the Regulation of Hostilities]; see also Sasha Radin, Global Armed
Conflict? The Threshold of Extraterritorial Non-International Armed Conflicts, 89 INT’L L.
STUD. 696, 706 (2013) (“This article takes the position that the criteria triggering the
application of Common Article 3 are the same as those required by customary
international law to establish the existence of a [non-international armed
conflict] . . . to conclude otherwise would create an additional category of conflict,
an outcome that is generally rejected.”). The precise threshold for triggering this
area of customary international law is unclear. See Noëlle Quénivet, Applicability
Test of Additional Protocol II and Common Article 3 for Crimes in Internal Armed Conflict,
in APPLYING INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN JUDICIAL AND QUASI-JUDICIAL
BODIES 41 (Derek Jinks et al. eds., 2014) (“Regrettably for us there is not readily
available answer to the question of whether international customary law provides
for a single definition of non-international armed conflict.”). In other words, while
the substantive provisions in Common Article 3 are widely accepted as being
grounded in customary law, the triggering mechanism for the article may not
necessarily reflect customary law. In their landmark 2011 study of the customary
rules applicable in warfare, the ICRC failed to address an issue of seeming central
importance: what is the customary law understanding of “armed conflict”? Id.
When asked about this oversight, an ICRC legal advisor responded that such an
answer would have required a study of its own. Id. (citing Malcolm McLauren &
Felix Schwendimann, An exercise in the development of international law: the new ICRC
study on customary international humanitarian law, 6 GER. L. J. 1217, 1227 (2005)).
117 See Corn, Hamdan, Lebanon, and the Regulation of Hostilities, supra note 116,
at 325–26 (“[T]his holding is limited by one critical reality: the gap it filled related
only to the principle of humane treatment. Nothing in that opinion addressed the
applicability of the other foundational principles of the law of war to extraterritorial
non-state armed conflicts.“); see also Aolain, supra note 82, at 1548 (noting that the
Court failed to address specifically what elements of the law of war apply to the
conflict with al-Qaeda).
118
It is unclear the extent to which the Court considered customary
international law in arriving at its opinion. The majority did briefly discuss the
customary norms encapsulated by Article 75 of Additional Protocol I and its impact
on interpreting Common Article 3 (see infra note 123). Four justices, including
Justice Stevens, also invoked customary international law in concluding that the
conspiracy charge against Hamdan was not a law of war violation. Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 610 (2006). Professors Julian Ku and John Yoo have
categorized Justice Stevens’s interpretation of customary international law in the
opinion as “lack[ing] a consistent interpretive methodology.” Julian Ku & John
Yoo, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Functional Case for Foreign Affairs Deference to the
Executive Branch, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 179, 194 (2006).
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v. U.S.,119 for example, the International Court of Justice concluded
that Common Article 3 applied to the conflict at issue not by virtue
of treaty law, but through the application of customary international
law.120 The court therefore included Common Article 3 within the
broad set of customary rules that govern in the case of all conflicts.121
In Hamdan, however, the Court did not seem to apply Common
Article 3 by virtue of customary law, or make any meaningful
determination about the status of customary law in the conflict.122
Justice Stevens discussed the “laws of war” at several points, but
never made a comprehensive assessment of what parts of the laws
of war applied in the case specifically, or the conflict generally.123
Some scholars question whether Justice Stevens, the author of the
majority opinion, fully realized the expansive nature of customary
law within the corpus of the law of war. 124 Despite the Court’s
decision to wade into the waters of international law, the Court gave
neither a detailed nor comprehensive explanation of the limits or
effects of its holding in terms of customary norms.

119
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, 14 (June 27, 1986).
120
Aolain, supra note 82, at 1545.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 1548 (noting that Justice Stevens’s approach leaves unanswered the
fundamental question of “which elements of the law of war apply to the conflict?”).
The Court did make mention of customary international law in conjunction with
one of its specific conclusions regarding Common Article 3, stating that its
requirement that trial procedures provide “all the judicial guarantees which are
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples” must be “understood to
incorporate at least the barest of those trial protections that have been recognized
by customary international law.” Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 633 (2006).
The Court went on to note that many of those protections are contained in Article
75 of Additional Protocol I, which the United States has not ratified. Id. Despite the
fact that the United States had not ratified that treaty, the Court concluded the
provisions should be applicable nonetheless because the government did not
express objections specifically regarding Article 75. Id. The Court, then, did
specifically apply customary international law in conjunction with its application
of Common Article 3 in this limited context. Id. at 634.
123 Id. at 634.
124
According to Professors Julian Ku and John Yoo, Justice Stevens’ analysis
“also demonstrates the majority’s lack of capacity in a highly technical area long
given to the political branches. Justice Stevens missed the fundamental point that
much of the law of war is customary, not written.” Ku & Yoo, supra note 118, at
194. It is not evident, then, that the Court was aware that by concluding that the
triggering threshold was met for Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, it
was also implicitly invoking the entire body of customary law applicable to armed
conflicts, including targeting rules.
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The outcome of Hamdan, of course, did not settle the issue of
conflict classification or laws of targeting for other nations, or for
many scholars.125 Nonetheless, the opinion has since been heavily
relied upon in the last dozen years by the United States government
in legally justifying the use of lethal force. These documents assert
that Hamdan serves as legal precedent for the proposition that the
law of armed conflict’s customary laws of targeting apply in
situations where military forces engage with al-Qaeda, seemingly
regardless of location or nature of hostilities in that location. This
Article next examines targeting rules under the law of armed conflict
and how Hamdan is essential in giving legal legitimacy to current
combat activities.
2.2. Jus in Bello and the Law of Targeting
A foundational maxim of the law of armed conflict is that
“the right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not
unlimited.”126 Ignoring this underlying principle results in arbitrary
conduct on battlefields. 127 Consequently, the law of targeting
provides parameters for parties to the conflict as they engage enemy
personnel and property during armed conflict. Understanding this
area of the law will further highlight the significance of Hamdan’s
conflict classification determination and the resultant triggering of
customary laws of war. Specifically, the law of armed conflict
defines who may not be targeted with deadly force during noninternational conflicts.

125 See, e.g., Dinstein, Concluding Remarks supra note 54, at 400 (“The idea that
a [non-international armed conflict] can be global in nature is oxymoronic: an
armed conflict can be a [non-international armed conflict] and it can be global, but
it cannot be both.”); see also Jens David Ohlin, Is Jus in Bello in Crisis?, 11 J. INT’L
CRIM. JUST. 27, 29–31 (2013); Jordan J. Paust, Propriety of Self-Defense Targetings of
Members of Al Qaeda and Applicable Principles of Distinction and Proportionality, 18
ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 565, 566–67 (2012); Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v.
Gov’t of Israel, HCJ 769/02 (2006) (determining that the conflict between Israel and
Palestinian terror organizations constituted an international armed conflict, in
seeming disagreement with Hamdan). The ICRC has also consistently disagreed
that a global non-international armed conflict exists. See Jelena Pejic, The Protective
Scope of Common Article 3: More than Meets the Eye, 93 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 189, 196
(2011).
126
Hague Regulation IV, supra note 24, at art. 22.
127 See MORRIS GREENSPAN, THE MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE 391 (1959).
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Origins of the Law of Targeting

The origins of this area of the law lie in the various treaties
regulating the means and methods of warfare. The Lieber Code,
drafted by Francis Lieber during the American Civil War, was one
of the first compilations of existing laws and customs of war. 128
Although this code was domestic in nature, it significantly
influenced subsequent international treaties including the 1899 and
1907 Hague Conventions.129 Specifically, Convention IV, commonly
referred to as Hague IV, codified principles such as military
necessity and unnecessary suffering.130 Many of these conventions
were incorporated and clarified in the Additional Protocol I to the
Geneva Conventions.131 Additional Protocol I, also known as AP I,
filled many of the gaps in the international law governing targeting
and incorporated existing principles from previous treaties.
Additionally, AP I defined principles and terms that are significant
to the law of targeting.132 While the United States is not a party to
AP I, the basic principles of targeting are viewed as customary
international law and applicable to not only international armed
conflicts but also non-international armed conflicts.133

128
See David Wallace & Shane Reeves, Modern Weapons and the Law of Armed
Conflict, U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS: LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 172 (Corn et al. eds.,
2015).
129
See Howard S. Levie, History of the Law of War on Land, INT’L REV. RED CROSS,
No. 838 (2000).
130 See Annex to Hague Convention No. IV, Respecting the Laws and Customs
of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2295.
131 See SOLIS, supra note 27, at 122 (“With Additional Protocol I, the bulk of the
customary law of war has become formalized.”).
132 See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I].
133
See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-1, Decision on the Defence
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 127 (Int’l Crim. Trib for the
Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995); INT’L INST. OF HUMANITARIAN L., THE MANUAL ON
THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT ¶ 1.2 (2006) [hereinafter NIAC
MANUAL]; see also JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 63 (2009).
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Targeting in Non-international Armed Conflicts

The basic principles of targeting include military necessity,
distinction, proportionality, and the prevention of unnecessary
suffering. These principles, along with the rules related to
precautions in the attack, guide all targeting decisions during armed
conflict. Of these, distinction, proportionality, and precautions have
particular significance in armed conflicts against non-State actors
such as al-Qaeda.134 The principle of distinction requires parties to
the conflict to “distinguish between the civilian population and
combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and
accordingly shall direct their operations only against military
objectives.”135
Under the principle of proportionality, “an attack is forbidden if
it may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or combination thereof, which
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated.” 136 The analysis is based on damage or
injury that is anticipated, not the amount that actually occurs.137
Precautions in the attack, like proportionality, are focused on
protecting the civilian population and require those who plan
attacks to “do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be
attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects and are not subject
to special protection.” 138 Also, planners are required to “take all
feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack
with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental
loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian

134
Much of the debate surrounding the use of human shields by non-State
actors in Iraq and Syria centers on distinction, proportionality and precautions. See
Adil Ahmad Haque, Off Target: Selection, Precaution, and Proportionality in the DoD
Manual, 92 INT’L L. STUD. 31 (2016); Marty Lederman, Thoughts on Distinction and
Proportionality in the December 2016 Revision to the Law of War Manual, JUST SECURITY
(Dec. 19, 2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/35617/thoughts-distinctionproportionality-december-2016-revision-law-war-manual/
[https://perma.cc/V7JG-H5U5].
135
AP I, supra note 132, at art. 48.
136
See MICHAEL N. SCHMITT ET AL., THE MANUAL ON THE LAW OF NONINTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT WITH COMMENTARY ¶ 2.1.1.4; see also AP I, supra
note 132, at art. 51(b).
137
YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 121 (2004).
138
See AP I, supra note 132, at art. 57(2)(a).
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objects.” 139 As stated above, these principles and rules are
customary international law and apply during Common Article 3
conflicts.140
2.2.3.
Targeting Individuals in Non-international Armed
Conflicts
Determining who may be lawfully targeted in a noninternational conflict is not as simple as in an international armed
conflict, where combatants are presumably distinguishable on the
battlefield. Unlike international armed conflicts where the status of
combatants and civilians is defined in AP I, the character of the
parties is not defined in Common Article 3. In the case of noninternational armed conflicts, 141 neither Common Article 3 nor
Additional Protocol II142 defines the term “civilian” or “combatant,”
but the protocol does mention organized armed groups.143 Without
a clear legal delineation of the status of individuals in non-

Id.
See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No.IT-94-1-1, Decision on Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 127 (Int’l Crim. Trib for the Former
Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995); NIAC MANUAL, supra note 133, ¶ 1.2 (2006). See
HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 133, at 63.
141
See Michael N. Schmitt, The Status of Opposition Fighters in Non-International
Armed Conflict, 88 INT’L L. STUD. 119, 120 (2011) [hereinafter Schmitt, Status of
Opposition Fighters]. Professor Schmitt writes, “Textually, the article merely refers
to “persons taking no active part in hostilities,” including “members of the armed
forces” who are hors de combat. The reference is somewhat useful in that it suggests
a normative distinction between those who actively participate in a noninternational armed conflict and those who do not. Yet, the failure to address party
status directly is unfortunate, for it begs the question of when non-State individuals
or groups qualify as a party.” Id.
142
AP II, supra note 41. Protocol II also establishes robust and detailed
parameters for the lawful conduct of hostilities in a non-international armed
conflict. However, the United States has not ratified this treaty. Moreover, the
trigger for Protocol II is not consistent with the threshold of application for
Common Article 3. Additional Protocol II “has a much more narrow field of
application than Common Article 3.” DEREK JINKS, September 11 and the Laws of War,
28 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 26 (2003) (citing the text of the two provisions, drafting history
of Additional Protocol II, and history of State practice). For example, Protocol II
requires the non-State armed group to exercise a degree of control over territory.
Id.
143 AP II, supra note 41, art 1.
139
140
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international conflicts, 144 compliance with the principle of
distinction becomes a challenge for military planners and
commanders. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to conclude “that two
broad categories of non-international armed conflict participants lie
in juxtaposition: civilians and organized armed groups.” 145
Furthermore, the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance states that “as the
wording and logic of [Common Article 3] and Additional Protocol
II reveals, civilians, armed forces, and organized armed groups of
the parties to the conflict are mutually exclusive categories also in
non-international armed conflict.” 146 Consequently, given the
language of Common Article 3 and the Interpretive Guidance, lethal
force can only be lawfully directed against members of organized
armed groups and civilians who take an active part in hostilities.
During a non-international armed conflict, then, a civilian
directly participating in hostilities is not protected from lethal
This precept brings up several challenges of
targeting. 147
interpretation, however. One issue is dealing with individuals
whose activities are categorized as “farmer by day, fighter by
night.” 148 The actual parameters of this debate 149 are beyond the
scope of this Article, but it is well accepted that there are
circumstances during armed conflicts where civilians may lawfully
144 See SEAN M. WATTS, Present and Future Conceptions of the Status of Government
Forces in Non-International Armed Conflict, 88 INT’L L. STUD. 145, 146 (2012),
https://digitalcommons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1058&context=ils
[https://perma.cc/8QHR-DF3T] (“Whereas the protections and obligations of the
law of [International Armed Conflicts] are premised almost entirely on the status
of affected persons, the law of [Non-international Armed Conflicts] spurns such
classifications, as well as the [International Armed Conflict] taxonomy of statusbased protection generally.”).
145
See Schmitt, Status of Opposition Fighters, supra note 141, at 120.
146 Id. at 128 (citing NILS MELZER, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, Interpretive
Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International
Humanitarian Law 32 (2009) [hereinafter Interpretive Guidance]).
147
See Common Article 3 provides protections for “[p]ersons taking no active
part in the hostilities.”; GC II, supra note 26, at art. 3 (stating that the law of armed
conflict does not provide authorization to target, rather it provides legal protection
for persons playing no active role in the conflict).
148
Charles Garraway, Direct Participation and the Principle of Distinction:
Squaring the Circle, in CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO THE LAWS OF WAR 180
(Caroline Harvey et al. eds., 2014).
149 Id. at 181; compare Interpretive Guidance, supra note 146, at 78, with Michael
N. Schmitt, The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities:
A Critical Analysis, 1 HARV. NAT’L SEC’Y J. 5 (2010), https://harvardnsj.org/wpcontent/uploads/sites/13/2015/01/Vol.-1_Schmitt_Final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GWQ5-U63Q].
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be targeted based on their conduct alone, irrespective of
membership in an armed group. 150 Such persons are subject to
attack only for the limited time they are actually involved in
hostilities.151
Individuals who are members of armed groups may also lose
their protected status and be lawfully targeted under the law of
armed conflict. There is serious disagreement, however, over
whether all members of a non-State armed group may be targeted,
or only a certain subset.152 There are two approaches to this issue.
One approach, asserted by the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance,
permits the lethal targeting of members of organized armed groups
who have a continuous combat function. 153 The Interpretive
Guidance states that:
[f]or the practical purposes of the principle of distinction,
therefore, membership in such groups cannot depend on
abstract affiliation, family ties, or other criteria prone to
error, arbitrariness or abuse. Instead, membership must
depend on whether the continuous function assumed by an
individual corresponds to that collectively exercised by the
group as a whole, namely the conduct of hostilities on behalf
of a non-State party to the conflict. Consequently, under
IHL, the decisive criterion for individual membership in an
organized armed group is whether a person assumes a
continuous function for the group involving his or her direct
participation in hostilities.154
Under this perspective, an individual who is a member of an
armed group may only be targeted if that person’s specific activities
fulfill the continuous combat function criteria. This approach has

150
See, e.g. Interpretive Guidance, supra note 146, at 46–64 (stating that a
person is considered to be directly participating in hostilities when the activity at
issue is directly related to a particular harm, the harm reaches a requisite threshold,
and there is a belligerent nexus).
151 Id. at 71.
152
Schmitt, Status of Opposition Fighters, supra note 141, at 120; E. Corrie
Westbrook Mack & Shane R. Reeves, Tethering the Law of Armed Conflict to
Operational Practice: “Organized Armed Group” Membership in the Age of ISIS, 36
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 355, 337 (2018) (“What remains unsettled is when an individual
is a targetable member of such a group.”).
153
Interpretive Guidance, supra note 146, at 33.
154 Id.
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been criticized by other scholars for its “inequity in the law”155 as it
appears to shield certain members of non-State armed groups from
lethal attack, where similar members of State armed forces are valid
targets in an international armed conflict.156
A different approach seeks to “comport[] with the underlying
logic of the distinction between civilians and organized armed
groups.”157 This approach proposes lethal targeting of members of
organized armed groups “so long as they remain active members of
the group, regardless of their function.”158 Such active membership
can be confirmed through various sources of intelligence. 159 The
United States military has adopted this second, broader, approach
to combatant classification in its doctrine. 160 According to the
American military understanding of this area of the law of war, an
individual who has been identified as being a member of a non-State
armed group may generally be targeted at any time, regardless of
specific activities.161 The United States’ position on lethal targeting
any member of a non-State armed group, coupled with its
classification of the global conflict against al-Qaeda as a global noninternational armed conflict is particularly critical when considering

155
Schmitt, Status of Opposition Fighters, supra note 141, at 133 (“[B]y the
proposed standard, direct attack on a member of an organized armed group
without a continuous combat function is prohibited . . . , but a member of the State’s
armed forces who performs no combat-related duties may be attacked at any
time.”).
156 Id. For example, an individual performing duties as a cook in al-Qaeda
would not be targetable under this framework, but a cook in the armed forces of a
State may be targeted at any time in an international armed conflict.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160
Law of War Manual, supra note 97, at 220 (“Membership in the armed
forces or belonging to an armed group makes a person liable to being made the
object of attack regardless of whether he or she is taking a direct part in hostilities.
This is because the organization’s hostile intent may be imputed to an individual
through his or her association with the organization.”). According to the American
military position, the fact that an individual is a member of such a non-State group
may be ascertained by formal indicia, including that the person took an oath or
wears a uniform, or may be gleaned by indirect criteria such as evidence that the
person has followed orders, entered facilities operated by the non-State group, or,
in some cases travelled with members of that group. Id. at 222.
161 See id. 220–24 (noting that this status-based targeting classification ceases
when individuals have been placed hors de combat—are out of the fight because of
injury, capture, or surrender—or ties with the armed group have been severed).
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targeting individuals away from “central” battlefields such as
Afghanistan.162
2.2.4.

The Geographic Scope of Targeting Rules

Whether the laws of armed conflict should apply outside of State
of most active hostilities—the “hot battlefield”—in the case of a noninternational armed conflict, is an area of contention among
scholars.163 Some posit that the laws of armed conflict should only
apply in limited areas, where armed groups are engaged in intense
fighting. 164 The ICRC takes the position that the laws of armed
conflict may extend beyond the hot battlefield into adjacent
territories, to ensure actors are not able to evade the rules by crossing
162
It is not evident from the DOJ White Paper or OLC Memo whether this
broad understanding of who may be lawfully targeted was relied upon. For
example, the DOJ White Paper consistently describes the potential target as a
“senior operational leader of the enemy forces who is actively engaged in planning
operations to kill Americans.” DOJ White Paper, supra note 103, at 3. It is unclear
whether the conduct of this individual plays a role in the legal opinion authorizing
attack, or whether the opinion rests on the individual’s membership in an armed
group. The paper does quote the ICRC Commentary on Protocol II in the paragraph
immediately before this, stating “[t]hose who belong to armed forces or armed
groups may be attacked at any time.” Id. In the OLC memorandum, the legal
reasoning authorizing the use of force on al Awlaki seems to be based somewhat
on the fact that he has played a continuing role of planning attacks from his Yemeni
base. OLC Memo, supra note 104, at 27. It is uncertain, though, whether this is
meaningful in calculating whether al Awlaki is a valid target under the laws armed
conflict, or whether the conflict classification attaches, geographically, to Yemen. It
is possible that the emphasis on a continuing threat language is pertinent to a
domestic authority to target, rather than an international one. See Wells Bennett, A
Clue About the Origins of “Imminence” in the OLC Memo, LAWFARE (June 25, 2014,
10:37 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/clue-about-origins-imminence-olcmemo [https://perma.cc/TL5M-JJXE].
163
Michael Schmitt, Charting the Legal Geography of Non-international Armed
Conflict, 90 INT’L L. STUD. 1, 8–18 (2014) [hereinafter Schmitt, Charting the Legal
Geography]. See, e.g., Jennifer C. Daskal, The Geography of the Battlefield: A Framework
for Detention and Targeting Outside the “Hot” Conflict Zone, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1165,
1167–70 (highlighting the parameters of the debate); Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, No. 121192 (D.D.C. July 18, 2012), 2012 WL 3024212 at 2 (discussing the risks of lethal
targetings “outside the context of armed conflict, in countries including Yemen,
Somalia, Pakistan, Sudan, and the Philippines”).
164 See, e.g., Rise of Drones II: Examining the Legality of Unmanned Targeting:
Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Nat’l Sec. & Foreign Affairs, 111th Cong. 3–5 (Apr.
28, 2010) (written testimony of Mary Ellen O’Connell, Professor, Notre Dame Law
School),
https://fas.org/irp/congress/2010_hr/042810oconnell.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YCD4-FD9S] (asserting that this view also represented the
position of the International Law Association).
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a State border. 165 However, the group rejects an expansive
application of these laws beyond such spill-over conflict. 166
Individuals acting in geographically dispersed States away from the
main fighting do not “carry” the law of armed conflict with them,
under this view. 167 Others take the view that the law of armed
conflict does attach to individuals acting in non-central locations, as
long as the parties to the conflict qualify under Common Article 3
and the conflict at issue, as a whole, is of sufficient intensity.168
Both the DOJ White Paper and OLC Memorandum appeared to
espouse a version of this last view.169 In discussing the geographic
scope of the non-international armed conflict with al-Qaeda and the
concern that the laws of war be given “appropriate application,”170
the OLC Memo states “that same consideration, reflected in Hamdan
itself . . . suggests a further reason for skepticism about an approach
that would categorically deny that an operation is part of an armed
conflict[,] absent a specified level and intensity of hostilities in the
particular location where it occurs.”171
Although the OLC Memorandum does not provide an entirely
transparent framework of its understanding of the geographical
application of the laws of war, it does indicate that the level of
hostilities within the relevant location is not an important
criterion.172 The United States government, then, has used Hamdan
to support its legal position that the laws of targeting apply even in
See Schmitt, Charting the Legal Geography, supra note 163, at 11.
Id. at 15.
167 Id. (discussing the ICRC’s view that operations that are conducted within
the territory of a nonbelligerent state should be governed by rules concerning law
enforcement operations).
168 Id. at 16.
169 See supra notes 108, 110 and accompanying text.
170
OLC Memo, supra note 104, at 26–27.
171 Id. See also id. at 24 (suggesting that the memo seems to be referencing an
earlier statement that the Hamdan Court was concerned with giving the broadest
possible application to Common Article 3).
172
On the other hand, the OLC Memorandum does indicate that the quality
of the group’s presence in an area may be a relevant consideration. See OLC Memo,
supra note 104, at 27 (stating that “AQAP has a significant and organized presence”
in Yemen); see also Ryan Goodman, The OLC’s Drone Memo and International Law’s
Ascendance,
JUST
SECURITY
(June
24,
2014),
https://www.justsecurity.org/12142/olc-memo-drones-international-lawgoodman/ [https://perma.cc/M6NP-PZGB] (stating that the memo suggests “that
the authorization to use lethal force may apply only in areas with a significant
presence and staging ground for enemy forces and from where attacks against the
United States are launched.”).
165
166
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geographically dispersed areas, including Yemen, placing it at odds
with groups such as the ICRC who would limit such application.
This line of reasoning would presumably apply to other areas, such
as Somalia and Pakistan, where the United States has conducted
hundreds of drone strikes in recent years.173 As the Hamdan Court
did not articulate a geographic scope to its conflict classification
holding, nor address the issues of necessary duration and intensity
of hostilities, in order for Common Article 3 to apply in a given
area—the decision does not clearly preclude the United States’ legal
position.
Another issue that seems to be assumed in the government’s
position in the DOJ White Paper and OLC Memorandum is the
cohesiveness of groups belonging under the al-Qaeda
organizational umbrella. One critique is that they assume that “alQaeda and its associated forces” qualify as a single armed group.174
Scholars point out that the splinter terror groups that have
allegiances with al-Qaeda do not clearly exhibit a unifying
command structure which would be sufficient to qualify them as a
part of the global non-international armed conflict.175 At least one
former Department of Defense official has articulated a robust set of
requirements for “associated forces” to be considered as such. 176
The articulated position does not require a unified chain of
command with al-Qaeda, however. Again, because the specific
qualities of al-Qaeda—including organizational structure—were
not addressed in Hamdan, the decision does not seem to restrain a
broad reading here by the executive branch.
173 See Micah Zenko, Obama’s Final Drone Strike Data, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS (Jan. 20, 2017), https://www.cfr.org/blog/obamas-final-drone-strikedata [https://perma.cc/CZ45-7LR6].
174 See Kevin Jon Heller, The DoJ White Paper’s Fatal International Law Flaw—
Organization, OPINIO JURIS (Feb. 5, 2013), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/02/05/thedoj-white-papers-fatal-international-law-flaw/ [https://perma.cc/828E-7RNR].
175 Id. (“The assumption that ‘al-Qa’ida and its associated forces’ constitute a
single organized armed group for purposes of [international law] . . . deeply
problematic.”). But see Peter Margulies, Networks in Non-International Armed
Conflicts: Crossing Borders and Defining “Organized Armed Group,” 89 INT’L L. STUD.
54, 55 (2013) (stating that al-Qaeda exhibits a “surprising degree of organization,”
considering the unconventional factors endemic to terrorist networks—creating a
sufficient justification for targeting affiliates).
176 See Jeh Charles Johnson, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Def., National Security
Law, Lawyers, and Lawyering in the Obama Administration, Dean’s Lecture at
Yale Law School (Feb. 22, 2012) in 31 YALE L. & POL’Y REV., 141, 146 (2012) (noting
that the Department of Defense requires that the armed group be organized, have
fought alongside al-Qaeda, and be considered a co-belligerent with al-Qaeda in
order to qualify under this phrase).
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The Law of Armed Conflict versus Human Rights Law

The United States government’s reliance on Hamdan in its
assertion that it is engaged in a global non-international armed
conflict against al-Qaeda is therefore of critical importance. In the
absence of an “armed conflict” classification, more restrictive
customary international human rights law would apply, 177
specifically to areas away from the central battlefield. The limits
regarding the targeting of individuals are quite different between
the two paradigms. International human rights law limits the
targeting of individuals only when “strictly unavoidable to protect
life.” 178 Further, “it is never permissible for killing to be the sole
objective of an operation” under human rights law. 179 This law
enforcement framework is thus significantly more restrictive in
terms of the use of force than the law of armed conflict. Further,
rules for detention are more tolerant under the law of armed
conflict.180
With the use of Hamdan, however, the United States government
maintains it is operating lawfully under the more permissive laws
of armed conflict, including status-based targeting rules. The
executive branch has stretched the inclusive holding of Hamdan to
apply the Common Article 3 classification to geographic locations
outside of Afghanistan. The nature of hostilities in those locations
is irrelevant, as long as an individual is a member of al-Qaeda or an
associated force. Thus, according to its view, the customary laws of
war apply to the conflict with al-Qaeda and its associates on a global
scale. This understanding indicates that individuals may be
lawfully attacked based on their status as members of al-Qaeda or
an associated group, at any time, worldwide.
177
Schmitt, Charting the Legal Geography, supra note 163, at 2–3. See generally
Ohlin, supra note 125, at 32–36 (explaining the different positions regarding the
relationship between the lex specialis of international humanitarian law and the lex
generalis of international human rights law).
178 Schmitt, Charting the Legal Geography, supra note 163, at 2 (quoting EIGHTH
UNITED NATIONS CONG. ON THE PREVENTION OF CRIME AND THE TREATMENT OF
OFFENDERS, BASIC PRINCIPLES ON THE USE OF FORCE AND FIREARMS BY LAW
ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS, at 114, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1, Sales No.
E.91.IV.2 (1990)).
179
Philip Alston, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or
Arbitrary Executions, ¶ 33, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010),
https://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.
24.Add6.pdf [https://perma.cc/2MHQ-QQ7A].
180
Schmitt, Charting the Legal Geography, supra note 163, at 2.
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2.3. Jus ad Bellum: Sovereignty and the Global Targeting Paradigm
The above discussion centers on the United States government’s
use of Hamdan in asserting that rules of targeting apply in any global
operation involving a member of al-Qaeda or its associated forces—
the jus in bello. Interestingly, the government has also appeared to
rely on the decision indirectly when justifying its use of force within
the sovereign borders of other States—the jus ad bellum. 181 The
United Nations Charter, which regulates the use of force by party
nations, expressly states that “[a]ll members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any State.”182 This
prohibition on the use of force is absolute with only two
exceptions: 183 if the United Nations Security Council authorizes
military action184 or if a State is acting under its inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense. 185 Host States, who are
authorized to internally handle domestic matters, 186 may also

181 Jus ad bellum outlines the framework for when a State actor may resort to
armed conflict and is “governed by an important, but distinct, part of international
law set out in the United Nations Charter.” GEOFFREY BEST, WAR AND LAW SINCE
1945 5 (2002); see Robert Kolb, Origin of the Twin Terms Jus Ad Bellum/Jus In Bello,
320 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 533, n.1 (Oct. 31, 1997) (“Jus ad bellum refers to the
conditions under which one may resort to war or to force in general; jus in bello
governs the conduct of belligerents during a war, and in a broader sense comprises
the rights and obligations of neutral parties as well.”).
182
U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
183
There is an ongoing debate about whether a humanitarian intervention can
act as a third exception to the United Nations prohibition on the use of force. See
generally Shane Reeves, To Russia With Love: How Moral Arguments For A
Humanitarian Intervention in Syria Opened The Door For An Invasion Of The Ukraine,
23 MICH. ST. INT’L. L. REV. 199, 199–229 (2014) (discussing the question of whether
the use of force is justified for humanitarian interventions). However, the concept
of “humanitarian intervention” has not emerged as customary international law or
a broadly accepted use of force exception. See Michael Schmitt & Chris Ford, The
Use of Force in Response to Syrian Chemical Attacks: Emergence of a New Norm?, JUST
SECURITY (Apr. 8, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/39805/force-responsesyrian-chemical-attacks-emergence-norm/ [https://perma.cc/5EM8-46GQ].
184
See U.N. Charter, supra note 182, at art. 42 (discussing when the Security
Council will consider taking measures that are required to “restore international
peace and security”).
185 Id. art. 51.
186 Id. art. 2, ¶ 7 (“Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any State or shall require the Members to submit such matters to
settlement under the present Charter…. “).
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consent to a State using force within its sovereign territory.187 As the
territorial integrity or political independence of the host State is not
violated in these circumstances, a “use of force” exception is not
required.188 As a result, if a nation requests assistance from another
State, that State may lawfully use force within the borders of the
requesting country.189
The United States relies heavily on the consent of a host nation
to gain access to territory for targeting purposes. For example, since
2002, the conflict between the Afghan government and the Taliban
has been non-international; the United States takes part by
invitation.190 As a consensual participant in this territorial civil war,
the United States targets the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and associates on
behalf of the Afghanistan government. In 2011, Yemen gave the
United States permission for the drone strike that killed Anwar alAwlaki.191 Taken together with the jus in bello analysis, as described
in the previous section, the United States may, therefore, lethally
target a member of al-Qaeda anywhere a host nation gives consent.
Thus, the United States could kill a member of al-Qaeda sitting in a
café in Paris, assuming the French consent and the strike is
otherwise in compliance with the law of armed conflict.192

187 See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts, in Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-third
Session, UN GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, art. 20, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001).
188
LOAC DESKBOOK, supra note 96, at 31 n.7.
189 See CORN, supra note 17, at 17.
190
When the United States launched the military campaign against the de
facto government of Afghanistan—the Taliban—on October 7, 2001, the conflict
was international. See Robin Geib & Michael Siegrist, Has the Armed Conflict in
Afghanistan Affected the Rules on the Conduct of Hostilities?, 93 INT’L REV. RED CROSS
11, 13–15 (Mar. 2011). However, the June 19, 2002 establishment of a new Afghan
Transitional Administration transitioned the continuing conflict with the Taliban
from international to non-international. See id. at 15–16.
191 See Shane Reeves & Jeremy Marsh, Bin Laden and Awlaki: Lawful Targets,
INT’L
REV.,
(Oct.
26,
2011),
HARV.
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2297061
[https://perma.cc/QH4E-W3HA]. The strike on al-Awlaki preceded the ongoing
Yemeni civil war that began in March 2015. Joseph Hincks, What You Need to Know
About the Crisis in Yemen, TIME (Nov 3, 2016), http://time.com/4552712/yemenwar-humanitarian-crisis-famine/ [https://perma.cc/V7YR-FCJB].
192
Aside from compliance with the law of targeting, the status of the al-Qaeda
member would also need to be assessed. See generally Schmitt, Status of Opposition
Fighters, supra note 141 (discussing the different statuses that may apply to
opposition fighters).
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In conjunction with the self-defense justification, the United
States has adopted the “unwilling or unable” theory of selfdefense.193 Under this theory, a State may use:
force in self-defense against a non-state actor on the territory
of a third State, without the consent of that third State . . . if
the non-state actor has undertaken an armed attack against
the State and the third State is itself unwilling or unable to
address the threat posed by the non-state actor.194
The United States most famously relied on the “unwilling or unable”
theory of self-defense to justify violating the sovereignty of Pakistan
in the 2011 operation to capture or kill Osama Bin Laden.195 This
position has subsequently been supported, either explicitly or
implicitly, by a host of additional State actors.196
At first blush, the Court’s expansive interpretation of Common
Article 3 in Hamdan did not appear to implicate the United States’
legal authority to use force within or against another nation.197 In
seemingly acknowledging a non-international armed conflict with
al-Qaeda, the Court left unaddressed how this determination might
affect the ability to use force against members of al-Qaeda inside the
borders of another sovereign State.
In fact, however, the
relationship between a globalized conflict with a non-State actor and
a State’s right to self-defense became interestingly intertwined in the
government’s jus ad bellum justifications.
In a 2011 speech, John Brennan, Assistant to the President for
Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, stated:

193 See Ashley S. Deeks, “Unwilling or Unable”: Toward a Normative Framework
for Extraterritorial Self-Defense, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 483, 485–87 (2012).
194
Elena Chachko & Ashley Deeks, Which States Support the ‘Unwilling or
Unable’ Test?, LAWFARE (Oct. 10, 2016, 1:55 PM). The “unwilling or unable” theory
of self-defense has similarities to the concept of humanitarian intervention, in that
States are perceived as either too weak or too callous to address a threat and thus
forfeit their sovereignty claim. See generally Reeves, supra note 183, at 205–12
(discussing humanitarian intervention in more depth).
195 See generally Chachko & Deeks, supra note 194 (discussing when a State is
unwilling or unable to address a non-State threat within its territory).
196
See generally id. (documenting international support for the “unwilling or
unable” test).
197
Hamdan dealt narrowly with an individual detained in Afghanistan,
where the jus ad bellum justifications for the use of force were well-accepted. See,
e.g., Jack M. Beard, America’s New War on Terror: The Case for Self-Defense under
International Law, 25 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 559 (2002) (positing that the U.S.’s
invasion of Afghanistan was a lawful use of force under self-defense).
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Because we are engaged in an armed conflict with al-Qa’ida,
the United States takes the legal position that—in accordance
with international law—we have the authority to take action
against al-Qa’ida and its associated forces without doing a
separate self-defense analysis each time. And as President
Obama has stated on numerous occasions, we reserve the
right to take unilateral action if or when other governments
are unwilling or unable to take the necessary actions
themselves.198
This statement indicates that the self-defense calculation
necessary under jus ad bellum may be fulfilled by the fact that the
United States is engaged in a global armed conflict with al-Qaeda.199
Taken together with other statements by both Bush and Obama
administration officials, the position may be that the “[jus ad bellum]
trigger is automatically satisfied more generally based on the
existence of a continuing [non-international armed conflict].” 200
That global conflict classification, of course, can ultimately be traced
back to the holding in Hamdan.
A full exploration of the legal standards applicable to a selfdefense justification is beyond the scope of this paper—but in
general, most States and scholars agree that a lawful exertion of selfdefense must be in response to either an actual armed attack, or one
that is imminent.201 As the above statement indicates, the United
States position seems to be that the presence of al-Qaeda, in itself,
without regard to individual activities or threats that the specific
presence poses, may be sufficient to trigger the right of self-

198
See John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism, “Strengthening Our Security by Adhering to Our Values and
Laws” Program on Law and Security at Harvard Law School, (Sept. 16, 2011),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/remarksjohn-o-brennan-strengthening-our-security-adhering-our-values-an
[https://perma.cc/H2P9-933B].
199 The Lawfare Institute in cooperation with Brookings, Legality of Targeted
Killing
Program
under
International
Law,
LAWFARE,
https://www.lawfareblog.com/legality-targeted-killing-program-underinternational-law [https://perma.cc/KK7F-H94R].
200 Id. This position appears to be a case of the tail wagging the dog, however,
and a conflation between jus ad bellum and jus in bello.
201 See, e.g., Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L.
REV. 1620, 1634–35 (1984) (positing that the right to act in self-defense in the case of
an imminent attack is consistent with the U.N. Charter).
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defense.202 Similarly, former State Department Legal Advisor Brian
Egan has stated that once the United States has used force against a
non-State group in lawful self-defense in the wake of an actual or
imminent armed attack, it is not legally required to conduct further
imminence analyses prior to subsequent uses of force.203 Taking a
slightly different approach, other government officials have stated
that certain known qualities of how al-Qaeda members operate are
relevant to any “imminence” assessment. 204 In other words, an
individual’s membership in al-Qaeda is, in itself, a consideration in
the imminence determination because of the known tactics and
practices of that non-State armed group. Additionally, the DOJ
White Paper appears to weave a jus in bello analysis of what
constitutes a member of an armed group in its discussion of

202
See Attorney General Eric Holder, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery by
Attorney General Eric Holder at Northwestern University School of Law (Mar. 5,
2012),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/text-attorney-generals-national-securityspeech [https://perma.cc/36JR-FUBC] (stating that the imminence calculation
would take into account al-Qaeda’s history of carrying out armed attacks, and their
demonstrated ability to attack with little warning in the future).
203
See State Department Legal Adviser Brian Egan, Address at the American
Society of International Law (Apr. 8, 2016), https://www.lawfareblog.com/Statedepartment-legal-adviser-brian-egans-speech-asil [https://perma.cc/V4BV-5KY9]
(stating that this is true as long as “hostilities have not ended”); Michael N. Schmitt,
Extraterritorial Lethal Targeting: Deconstructing the Logic of International Law, 52
COLUM. J. TRANSNATIONAL L. 77, 90 (2013) (describing the legal positions
surrounding required imminence assessments for subsequent attacks).
204
John Brennan stated that various attributes associated with al-Qaeda
specifically play a role in the imminence analysis: “We are finding increasing
recognition in the international community that a more flexible understanding of
“imminence” may be appropriate when dealing with terrorist groups . . . . [A]fter
all, al-Qa’ida does not follow a traditional command structure, wear uniforms,
carry its arms openly, or mass its troops at the borders of the nations it attacks.
Nonetheless, it possesses the demonstrated capability to strike with little notice and
cause significant civilian or military casualties. Over time, an increasing number of
our international counterterrorism partners have begun to recognize that the
traditional conception of what constitutes an “imminent” attack should be
broadened in light of the modern-day capabilities, techniques, and technological
innovations of terrorist organizations.”
Brennan, supra note 198.
This
understanding is also reflected in the DOJ White Paper, though the self-defense
discussion is couched in an examination of constitutional rights, not international
law. See DOJ White Paper, supra note 103, at 7–8 (“By its nature, therefore the threat
posed by al-Qa’ida and its associated forces demands a broader concept of
imminence in judging when a person continually planning terror attacks presents
an imminent threat, making the use of force appropriate.”). For a thorough
examination of the factors that states consider in the Jus ad Bellum analysis involving
non-state actors, see Daniel Bethlehem, Self-Defense Against an Imminent or Actual
Armed Attack by NonState Actors, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 770 (2012).
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imminence. 205 It is difficult to piece together a comprehensive
position that the United States takes on the jus ad bellum self-defense
analysis when it comes to non-State actors.206 However, it is evident
from the above examples that membership in the al-Qaeda
organization is important to this analysis. That the global armed
conflict with al-Qaeda is somehow defined under international law,
and that this fact is important in its self-defense calculation, is
apparent in several government statements regarding the resort to
force.207
2.4. Domestic Authority—The 2001 Authorization for the Use of
Military Force
The above discussion focuses on how Hamdan has been used by
the United States to justify its actions under international law.
Interestingly, the case is also part of the foundation of the
government’s attempt to justify the global war against al-Qaeda
under the domestic legal framework. The 2001 Authorization for
the Use of Military Force (AUMF) authorizes the President to use
205
DOJ White Paper, supra note 103, at 8 (“Moreover, where the al-Qa'ida
member in question has recently been involved in activities posing an imminent
threat of violent attack against the United States, and there is no evidence
suggesting that he has renounced or abandoned such activities, that member’s
involvement in al-Qaida’s continuing terrorist campaign against the United States
would support the conclusion that the member poses an imminent threat.”).
Confusingly, this discussion is found within a larger examination of the
constitutional rights at issue in the proposed strike, although international sources
are cited throughout. Id. at 6–8. It is therefore unclear if the term “imminence” is
being used in the jus ad bellum context.
206 COMM. ON INT’L LAW, N.Y.C. BAR, THE LEGALITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
OF TARGETED KILLINGS BY DRONES LAUNCHED BY THE UNITED STATES 5 (2014),
https://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20072625TheLegalityofTargetedInternationalKillingsbyUS-LaunchedDrones.pdf.
[https://perma.cc/X6JX-NE34].
207 In a 2013 address, for example, President Obama remarked: “Moreover,
America’s actions are legal . . . . Under domestic law, and international law, the
United States is at war with al Qaeda, the Taliban, and their associated forces. We
are at war with an organization that right now would kill as many Americans as
they could if we did not stop them first. So this is a just war—a war waged
proportionally, in last resort, and in self-defense.” President Barack Obama, The
Future of our Fight Against Terrorism, remarks at National Defense University
(May 23, 2013), https://www.lawfareblog.com/text-presidents-speech-afternoon
[https://perma.cc/7X7T-T5C4]. It is questionable whether the classification of the
conflict with al-Qaeda in the in bello context should bear any legal significance in
the ad bellum framework.
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“all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September
11, 2001.”208 The executive branch has used Hamdan in two distinct
ways in its efforts to show compliance with the AUMF. First, it has
cited to Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Hamdan for the
proposition that any operation against al-Qaeda would necessarily
be part of the greater global armed conflict, and not constrained
geographically by international law or the AUMF because the status
of the parties is of paramount importance.209 It is uncertain what
parallels are being drawn between the international law
understanding of the armed conflict, and the scope of the conflict as
defined in the AUMF in this instance, however.
Secondly, the government has asserted that compliance with the
AUMF is ultimately contingent on the country’s compliance with
international law. 210 In other words, the AUMF should be
interpreted as being consistent with international law. 211 After
listing the case authorities standing for this proposition,212 the OLC
Memorandum states that since the military operation against alAwlaki would be a part of the greater non-international armed
conflict with al-Qaeda, the strike would comply with international
law as long as it abides by the applicable rules of armed conflict.213
The Memorandum then immediately launches into a discussion
regarding Hamdan and the geographic scope of the noninternational armed conflict with al-Qaeda for purposes of applying

208
Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat.
224 (2001).
209
The DOJ White Paper, after establishing that the U.S. is currently in a noninternational armed conflict with al-Qaeda as held in Hamdan, goes on to State that:
“Any U.S. operation would be part of this non-international armed conflict, even if
it were to take place away from the zone of active hostilities . . . . For example, the
AUMF itself does not set forth an express geographic limitation on the use of force
it authorizes.” See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 631 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (what makes a non-international armed conflict distinct from an
international armed conflict is “the legal status of the entities opposing each other”);
DOJ White Paper, supra note 104, at 3.
210
OLC Memo, supra note 104, at 24.
211 Id.
212 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Appeals Chamber Judgment,
¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jul. 15, 1999) (citing several federal
court cases, including the Supreme Court decision in F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v.
Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004)).
213 Id. at ¶ 24 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jul. 15, 1999).
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the laws of armed conflict. 214 In considering the fundamental
principles of the laws of war, including military necessity,
prevention of unnecessary suffering, proportionality and
distinction, the document then states that the military would indeed
abide by those precepts.215 The government’s arguments regarding
compliance with the AUMF, then, are ultimately tied to its reading
of Hamdan in justifying its conduct of hostilities in bello. The memo
ultimately concludes that the government is acting in compliance
with international law, and therefore likewise not acting in violation
of the AUMF.216
3.

LESSONS FROM HAMDAN

In many ways, Hamdan is the legal keystone for many of the
country’s global military actions today, and the root of some of its
most criticized practices. In effect, the Hamdan decision has been
used by the United States as standing authority to target al-Qaeda
and associates—assuming sovereignty and the law of armed conflict
are considered—wherever located.
Many scholars and
organizations have expressed concern or outright disagreement
with this approach.217 Prominent scholars and institutions continue
to oppose the underlying assumption itself, that a global noninternational armed conflict with al-Qaeda, in fact, has ever existed

Id.
Id. at 28–29.
216 Id. at 30.
217
See, e.g., UN Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations on the
Fourth Periodic Report of the United States of America, UN Doc.
CCPR/C/USA/CO/4, (Apr. 23, 2014) (“The Committee notes the State party’s
position that drone strikes are conducted in the course of its armed conflict with AlQaida, the Taliban and associated forces in accordance with its inherent right of
national self-defence, and that they are governed by international humanitarian law
as well as by the Presidential Policy Guidance that sets out standards for the use of
lethal force outside areas of active hostilities. Nevertheless, the Committee remains
concerned about the State party’s very broad approach to the definition and
geographical scope of ‘armed conflict’, including the end of hostilities, the unclear
interpretation of what constitutes an ‘imminent threat’, who is a combatant or a
civilian taking direct part in hostilities, the unclear position on the nexus that should
exist between any particular use of lethal force and any specific theatre of hostilities,
as well as the precautionary measures taken to avoid civilian casualties in practice
(arts. 2, 6 and 14).”).
214
215
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under international law.218 But until now, little attention has been
paid to the significant role that the Hamdan decision has played in
the government’s legal reasoning, or the precise series of links the
executive branch has made between the holding and its legal
justifications for its conduct of hostilities. Whether these links and
assertions rest on a fair interpretation of the opinion, or whether
they constitute a house of cards built on Hamdan, is of certain interest
to international and human rights law scholars, and the American
public at large.219
The Hamdan Court implicitly accepted one of the preconditions
to the application of Common Article 3, which is the presence of an
armed conflict. The failure to address the “armed conflict”
threshold matter does, and will continue to, affect reliance on the
holding in the face of arguments that the armed conflict with alQaeda has functionally ceased. 220 Further, the Court’s expansive
understanding of Common Article 3—that it stands in
“contradistinction” to Common Article 2—has provided
unexpected legitimacy to United States’ legal positions regarding
extraterritorial targeting. Whether the Court intended for this
classification to extend beyond the borders of Afghanistan is not
clear. However, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court intended to
open a transnational targeting aperture for the United States
government. The executive branch later used this categorization of
hostilities to assert that the customary rules of warfare applied
globally to the conflict with al-Qaeda, rather than more restrictive
human rights law. 221 The Court’s avoidance in articulating the
218 See, e.g., Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, International Humanitarian Law and
the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflict, at 10, 32IC/15/11 (Dec. 2015) (“The
ICRC does not share the view that a conflict of global dimensions is, or has been,
taking place [between al Qaeda and the United States].”); Dinstein, Concluding
Remarks, supra note 54, at 407–08 (stating that a non-international armed conflict
cannot be global as only one state is in the conflict).
219 See, e.g., Anna Diakun, Fighting to Bring the Drone Program Into the Light,
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Oct. 25, 2016, 11:30 AM),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/targeted-killing/fighting-bringdrone-program-light [https://perma.cc/3U2E-V25K] (noting that the American
public has a right to examine the government’s justifications for foreign drone
strikes—the legal bases of which are still largely unclear even after the disclosure
of the OLC Memo and DOJ White Paper).
220 See Kenneth Roth, The War against Al-Qaeda Is Over, WASH. POST (Aug. 2,
2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-war-against-al-qaeda-isover/2013/08/02/3887af74-f975-11e2-b018-5b8251f0c56e_story.html
[https://perma.cc/8DK9-FJVK].
221 See infra section 2.2.5.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss2/2

2019] Hamdan and the Legal Justifications for Global Targeting

373

traditional standards of Common Article 3 application—including a
lack of consideration of the specific organizational characteristics of
al-Qaeda and duration and intensity of hostilities within
Afghanistan—has paradoxically offered the American government
much room to maneuver in interpreting the proper scope of
applying the laws of targeting elsewhere. The decision ultimately
provided tacit legal validity to the government’s application of
targeting rules to areas outside of the “hot battlefield” against
members of al-Qaeda and associated forces. In effect, the Hamdan
opinion has provided the executive branch an opportunity to claim
legal legitimacy for its actions, without discernable limits.
The United States currently has 8,000 special operations
personnel deployed in 80 different countries 222 in an effort to
weaken a thriving al-Qaeda and its ideological offspring.223 A third
Presidential administration has continued the highly-contested
practice of lethal targeting by drones within multiple foreign
countries.224 Concerns that the legal framework under which the
United States conducts counter-terrorism operations encourages the

222
Leo Shane III, SOCOM Head: We Can’t Do Everything, MILITARY TIMES,
(May 4, 2017), https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagoncongress/2017/05/04/socom-head-we-can-t-do-everything/
[https://perma.cc/44W6-48SN]; see also WHITE HOUSE, REPORT ON THE LEGAL AND
POLICY FRAMEWORKS GUIDING THE UNITED STATES’ USE OF MILITARY FORCE AND
RELATED NATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS (2018),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/document-white-house-legal-and-policyframeworks-use-military-force [https://perma.cc/Y47Y-6YYD] [hereinafter 2018
MILITARY FORCE REPORT] (disclosing to Congress areas where American troops are
currently deployed and justifications for the use of force).
223 See, e.g., Russ Mead, Six Years Since Bin Laden’s Death, And His Group is
More Powerful Than Ever, DAILY CALLER (May 2, 2017),
http://dailycaller.com/2017/05/02/six-years-since-bin-ladens-death-and-hisgroup-is-more-powerful-than-ever/ [https://perma.cc/2HAU-GNV2] (asserting
the remaining ideology and legacy of Bin Laden and the U.S. presence in fighting
terrorism worldwide).
224 See Micah Zenko, Obama’s Embrace of Drone Strikes Will Be a Lasting Legacy,
N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 12, 2016, 2:57 PM),
https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/01/12/reflecting-on-obamaspresidency/obamas-embrace-of-drone-strikes-will-be-a-lasting-legacy
[https://perma.cc/CZ45-7LR6] (describing the increasing number of drone
strikes since 2009); Spencer Ackerman, Trump Ramped Up Drone Strikes in America’s
Shadow Wars, DAILY BEAST (Nov. 26, 2018, 10:38 AM),
https://www.thedailybeast.com/trump-ramped-up-drone-strikes-in-americasshadow-wars [https://perma.cc/7R3X-M6BS] (stating that hundreds of United
States drone strikes occurring in Yemen, Pakistan and Somalia from 2016 to 2018).
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“creep of war” have therefore proven accurate. 225 This is not
inconsequential behavior. The logic of the Hamdan opinion
underpins the United States’ ever-expanding global targeting
campaign and other State actors appear increasingly comfortable
with this paradigm. 226 In this transnational era of warfare, 227 the
United States’ broad interpretation of the Hamdan opinion may
become persuasive on a global scale. The Hamdan Court’s expansive
conflict classification, and the government’s subsequent use of that
precedent, may also dictate future analyses regarding transnational
non-State armed groups and accompanying rules of warfare.228 As
a “specially affected State” the United States’ actions are extremely
influential in developing customary international law. 229
225 See Daskal, supra note 163, at 1173; see generally ROSA BROOKS, HOW
EVERYTHING BECAME WAR AND THE MILITARY BECAME EVERYTHING: TALES FROM THE
PENTAGON (Simon and Schuster 2016) (arguing that increases in remote military
abilities contribute to blurring lines between civilian and soldier).
226 See, e.g., Judah Ari Gross & Associated Press, With Egypt’s Blessing, Israel
Conducting Drone Strikes in Sinai—Report, TIMES ISR. (July 11, 2016, 1:44 PM),
https://www.timesofisrael.com/with-egypts-blessing-israel-conducting-dronestrikes-in-sinai-report/ [https://perma.cc/JWF7-KCNK] (presenting Egypt’s
supporting of Israel’s drone strikes against terrorists operating in the Sinai
Peninsula); Associated Press, Jordan Drones Hit IS Arms Depot, Barracks in Southern
Syria, FOX NEWS (Feb. 4, 2017),
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/9cc4b40802d143b69ca40b6c299878b9/jordandrones-hit-arms-depot-barracks-southern-syria [https://perma.cc/4UHU-4QAR]
(describing Jordan carried out airstrikes against Islamic State targets in southern
Syria). However, “[i]n the 15 years since the first U.S. drone strike, armed drones
have been purchased by militaries around the world, but their use has remained
tethered to active battlefields and areas where governments are acting with the
consent of the targeted state.” J. Dana Stuster, The State of Sovereignty, LAWFARE
(Apr. 30, 2017, 10:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/state-sovereignty
[https://perma.cc/Y7BJ-UUD9].
227
9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 68, at 361–62 (“In the post-9/11
world, threats are defined more by the fault lines within societies than by the
territorial boundaries between them…. [C]hallenges have become transnational
rather than international. That is the defining quality of world politics in the
twenty-first century.”).
228 See 2018 MILITARY FORCE REPORT, supra note 222, at 1–2 (stating that the
United States is currently in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda, al Shabaab—an
associated force of al-Qaeda, the ISIS, the Taliban, and the Taliban Hiqqani
Network). Indeed, parallel reasoning may have influenced the targeting
justifications for ISIS members located outside of the “hot battlefields” of Iraq and
Syria.
229
The importance of “specially affected States” was acknowledged by the
International Court of Justice in the North Seas Continental Shelf Cases. Specifically,
the court stated: “[A]n indispensable requirement would be that within the period
in question, short though it may be, State practice, including that of States whose
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Customary international law, “by its nature . . . . evolves based on
the conduct of States combined with their opinio juris. This
evolutionary dynamic of crystallization is often driven by States
acting in a manner that is not contemplated by existing law and,
indeed, sometimes contrary to that law.” 230 In fact, the Hamdan
armed conflict classification paradigm may perhaps emerge as a
new customary international norm.231
The impact and continued importance of Hamdan, therefore,
cannot be overstated. It may also serve as a cautionary tale
regarding judicial restraint, the domestic application of international
law, and abdication of executive deference. While the opinion was
clearly intended to address the treatment of detainees, it also
ultimately laid the legal foundation for the United States’ global
targeting campaign through the subsequent invocation of the
customary laws of war. It is not clear that the Court realized the
potential ramifications of its holding in this area.
If a global non-international armed conflict does, indeed, exist
between the United States and al-Qaeda, then the principle of
humanity, as expressed through humane treatment provisions in
Common Article 3, undoubtedly applies. However, equally as
applicable is the principle of military necessity which includes the
lawful targeting of al-Qaeda members. Balancing these competing
principles is exceedingly important as “[d]anger ensues for the

interests are specially affected, should have been both extensive and virtually
uniform in the sense of the provision invoked;—and should moreover have
occurred in such a way as to show a general recognition that a rule of law or legal
obligation is involved.” North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den., Ger. v. Neth.),
Judgement, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3, 44, ¶ 74 (Feb. 20). The concept is reiterated—though
the terms “particularly involved” and “important” States are used—in the
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102
(1987); INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY IHL DATABASE, https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_in [https://perma.cc/NG322T7Y] (“It is not simply a question of how many States participate in the practice,
but also which States.”). For a more detailed discussion, see J. Jeremy Marsh, Lex
Lata or Lex Ferenda? Rule 45 of the ICRC Study on Customary International
Humanitarian Law, 198 MIL. L. REV. 116, 127 & 151–53 (2008).
230 See Schmitt & Ford, supra note 183.
231 See supra text 24 and accompanying notes 120–21; see also Corn, Hamdan,
Lebanon, and the Regulation of Hostilities, supra note 22, at 349 (“Whether other nations
would follow this course of action is unknown. However, because U.S. armed
forces are the most frequently engaged armed forces in the world, such a move by
the United States would result in at least a re-evaluation of current legal
interpretation by major allies and military partners.”).
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international community if either concept gains primacy.”232 Over
emphasis on military necessity has historically led to horrendous
atrocities in warfare and “[c]onversely, when humanitarian
concerns become dominant state military actions are unrealistically
restricted by burdensome regulations diminishing the likelihood of
compliance.” 233 Upsetting the delicate balance between these
competing principles thus inevitably results in a downward spiral
into the brutality and savagery that has for so long defined
warfare.234 As applied by the executive branch, then, the Hamdan
holding ultimately addresses not only the “noblest humanitarian
impulses,” but also the military necessities of transnational
warfare.235
The war against al-Qaeda and associates has continued for 19
years unabated. Many of those now sent to fight in the conflict have
little to no memory of its beginnings. They deserve to understand
how the Supreme Court, in the 2006 Hamdan decision,
fundamentally changed the extent to which the United States
government could legally justify where and when we can fight the
nation’s wars. While Hamdan is traditionally viewed as an opinion
on detention, it has also been used to address a question that is now
almost forgotten: what happens when we fight a transnational,
ideologically motivated group that is not restricted by geography or
nationality? The significance and long-term impact of Hamdan is
extraordinary, albeit for different reasons than intended by the
Supreme Court.

See Reeves & Thurnher, supra note 18, at 2.
Id.
234 See Law of War Manual, supra note 97, at 7–17 (discussing the history of
warfare); see also Michael N. Schmitt, Military Necessity and Humanity in International
Humanitarian Law: Preserving the Delicate Balance, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 795, 797–99 (2010)
(explaining the risk of an overemphasis on either overarching principle).
235
DINSTEIN, supra note 137, at 1 (“Some people, no doubt animated by the
noblest humanitarian impulses, would like to see zero-casualty warfare. However,
this is an impossible dream. War is not a chess game. Almost by definition, it entails
human losses, suffering and pain. As long as it is waged, humanitarian
considerations cannot be the sole legal arbiters of the conduct of hostilities.”).
232
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